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East Europe

East Europe

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Volunteers To Be Recruited for Slovenia, Croatia

AU0407155191 Sofia BTA in English
1456 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 4 (BTA)—The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Union of Macedonian Societies (IMRO—UMS) has set up a committee that will recruit volunteers to defend the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia. The committee was established after many Bulgarian citizens rang up the IMRO headquarters expressing their desire to enroll as volunteers.

A IMRO—UMS declaration made public by Mr. Evgeni Ekov, secretary of the union, says that special teams of medical workers, sappers and other specialists will be formed. Depending on the course of events, they may help the reconstruction and development of the new sovereign states.

The IMRO—UMS expresses the hope that the "lives of our Slovene and Croatian brothers are as dear to the Bulgarian Government as the lives of the Kuwaitis," and that "the IMRO—UMS will be rendered the necessary assistance."

Economic Rights in Draft Constitution Analyzed

91BA0814A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by Prof. Vasil Mruchkov: "Economic and Social Rights in Draft of New Constitution"]

[Text] The draft constitution has already been debated at a first reading in the plenary sessions of the Grand National Assembly. This makes us hope that, despite all the difficulties in its work, the parliament has undertaken the implementation of its main task: the adoption of the new constitution. This hope is also based on the draft constitution itself. With the democratic solutions that it contains, as a whole, it provides a firm foundation for discussion and a promising start for the adoption of a contemporary modern Bulgarian constitution that will set firm legal foundations for the democratic structure of society and a peaceful transition to democracy.

In its second chapter, the draft constitution ascribes an important role to the Basic Rights and Obligations of the Citizens (Articles 24-61). The new democratic solutions included in this part of the constitution are unquestionable: Priority is given to the basic rights, placing the individual in the center of the constitutional system; the introduction of basic rights, which are new in type and content (the right to life, sharp restrictions on or elimination of the death penalty, free choice of residence, freedom to leave or return to the country, the right to information, the inviolability of private life, and so forth); the inalienable nature of the basic rights; the acceptance of universal human values; and many others.

Some of the economic rights of the citizens include economic and social rights. These are the following: the right to work, to a free choice of profession and place of work, to safe and healthy working conditions, to strike, to social security, to health protection, and so forth.

The structure of the economic and social rights is such as to take into consideration the progressive leading ideas and principles stipulated in the preamble of the draft and in the basic principles (chapter I), developed and concretized so that the constitution as a single entity may remain true to itself and develop an internal unity between the proclaimed principles and their systematic implementation. In the field of economic and social rights, the ideas and principles proclaimed in the draft are the following: the existence of a social state (preamble), the protection of labor (Article 16, paragraph 1 of the draft), and the "desire" to observe the International Charter of Human Rights and international law (the preamble).

A basic embodiment of the social nature of the state is found in the economic and social rights of the citizens. The extent to which these rights are recognized and protected largely confirms or refutes the characterization of the state as being a social state. Without such a characterization, this may prove to be nothing but a declaration. The protection of labor is implemented by acknowledging and protecting economic and social

rights. If such rights are absent or insufficient, labor protection becomes a pious wish. Finally, in the field of economic and social rights, the international human rights charter and international law are tangibly present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966; and the basic convention of the International Labor Organization (on the elimination of forced labor, trade union freedom, full and productive employment, wage equality, sensible limitation of working time, healthy and safe labor conditions, and so forth.). These international acts (the pact and the corresponding conventions of the International Labor Organization) were ratified by Bulgaria and, in the case of their implementation, our state has assumed not only moral but also international commitments.

The suggested structure of the economic and social rights as a whole is consistent with these requirements. However, it could also be subjected to some critical remarks aimed at its further improvement.

Above all, lacking in the draft constitution are some basic economic and social rights that have received international recognition in the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: the right to an acceptable living standard (Article 11 of the pact), and the legal and special protection of children and not of childhood, as is inaccurately indicated in Article 14 of the draft (Article 10, paragraph 3 of the pact and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of Children, recently ratified by the Grand National Assembly). The right to trade union associations has not been satisfactorily settled. Trade union organizations seem to be "attached," among other things, to the associations listed in Article 12 of the draft; the right to trade union associations itself has not been independently settled in the chapter on the basic rights, where it should have been systematically placed, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 8 of the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 22 of the Pact on Civil and Political Rights, and Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization. It would be proper to raise to the level of a constitutional standard the trilateral cooperation among the state, the trade unions, and employers, which was born out of practical experience and has been successfully functioning on the national level through the Permanent Tripartite Commission for the Coordination of Interests, as well as the bilateral cooperation between trade unions and employers through collective contracting in settling labor relations. These are not circumstantial or transitional structures but reliable mechanisms born of social necessity, which have a great future and are very promising in a democratic society and in a socially oriented market economy, not only in settling labor relations but also in maintaining and keeping the social peace. This has been confirmed by international experience and by the intensive activities of the Permanent Trilateral Commission for the Coordination of Interests. However, the introduction of bilateral and trilateral cooperation requires that the place of the employers be stipulated in

the course of the transition to market relations and under the conditions of a market economy. Without them, there can be no true bilateral and trilateral cooperation. Yet these have been totally "forgotten" in the constitutional structure.

Let us now go back to that which the draft includes concerning the economic and social rights of the citizens. Here, as well, the structure requires some remarks and objections.

The main policy of the state concerning the right to work is stipulated in Article 46, paragraph 1: "The state will assist in the exercise of this right in accordance with their (the citizens') education and skills." This "assistance" is a wish without any specific content. Today, as well, through the Grand National Assembly, the government, its agencies, and the local managing authorities, given the difficult times, are doing a great deal more than "assisting." It is not a question of a "pledge" by the state to guarantee the right to work. Under the new economic conditions and the current situation in the country, this would be, to say the least, unrealistic. However, the draft gives the impression that it has "abstained" (justifiably so) from making very promising obligations on the part of the state in this area and has gone quite far and found itself at the other extreme. The state, a social state even less so, cannot distance itself that far from the implementation of the right to work, not only because the right to work is facing a difficult situation and today, more than at any other time, needs the protection of the social state, but also because the state cannot reduce its policy in this area to virtually meaningless assistance. The social state has the obligation to be concerned with the creation of conditions and to create such conditions for the exercise of the right to work by the citizens, not only on the basis of their education and skills but also on their state of health. This idea, it seems to me, should be clearly expressed in the constitution. It is the foundation of the social protection of the citizens and an important part of the protection of labor by the state as proclaimed by the draft in Article 16, paragraph 1.

Also inadequate is the stipulation of Article 46, paragraph 5, of the draft. It states that "the working people have the right to safe and healthy working conditions, a minimum wage, and rest according to the conditions and procedures stipulated in the law." With such a text, this stipulation is very distant from the rich content of Article 17 of the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and from the protection of labor as proclaimed by the draft.

I find puzzling the stipulation of the draft, according to which "the working people have the right to a minimum wage." I ascribe this to the inaccurate use of the expression "minimum wage." In all likelihood, it is a question of a "minimum labor wage." What is more important, however, is the essence of the problem. A "minimum labor wage," as interpreted in the conventions of the International Labor Organization (Conventions No. 26 of 1928, No. 99 of 1951, and No. 131 of 1970) and as has

been practiced in the country since 1956 as a national minimal wage, is the wage paid for the least skilled labor that may ensure a living minimum for the survival of the working people. Is this what the constitution stipulates for the Bulgarian citizens? To proclaim in the constitution as the basic right of the citizens their right to a minimum wage means that the right to a wage of 4 million working people may be reduced by the fundamental law to their right to a minimum monthly wage stipulated for the country, regardless of the work they have invested and the results of their labor. However hard the times we are living in may be, hardly anyone would accept such a prospect. I do not believe that this is or could be the idea in the draft. However, it follows from the text. What the international acts demand (Article 7 of the pact) is the right to "a just wage and an equal wage for equal work." A "just" wage is a wage that is based on the labor invested and the results of such labor. This, however, is something entirely different from what the draft stipulates. Furthermore, this stipulation in the constitutional draft does not include basic rights that are expressly stipulated in Article 7 of the pact, such as a sensible limitation of working time, the right to leave, and so forth. This indicates that this stipulation needs a serious reinterpretation and addition.

We welcome the constitutional codification of the right to strike (Article 47 of the draft). However, it, too, has been only partially expressed. The right to strike as the "right of the working people" is the right to protect their collective economic and social (labor) interests. This idea should be clearly expressed in the constitution.

Also too general and inaccurate is the stipulation of Article 48 of the draft. It briefly establishes two different rights: the right to social (the preferred term should have been the Bulgarian expression "societal") security and the right to social (societal) aid. Their content is different and should have a suitable place in the draft in a more expanded interpretation, and their basic content should be outlined. Yet, the fundamental aspect of the right to social security is the right to security in the case of temporary or permanent disability and the right to social assistance when experiencing material difficulties.

The stipulation of Article 52 of the draft (the right to free medical services in state health institutions and health protection) is also worth a remark. As it stands, it is inconsistent with Article 12, paragraph 1, of the pact, which calls for the "full right of any individual to attain the best possible condition of physical and spiritual health." Instead, the draft settles partial, albeit important, problems, such as the right to free medical services in state health establishments, health protection, full opportunity to open private medical institutions, and so forth.

The formulation of democratic and humane principles in the draft constitution is its unquestionable merit. It deserves full support. Now the question is for the proclaimed principles to be subsequently constitutionally

developed because, otherwise, some of them risk remaining nothing but pious wishes. This will create a logical consistency and internal cohesion and realism in the draft and in the future constitution. However, it is also of major practical significance. According to Article 5 of the draft, the stipulations of the constitution will have a direct impact. This exceptionally important and new solution applies also to the fundamental principles. If such principles are not sufficiently concretized, however, their utilization and application will be difficult. In this respect, it seems to me, the draft needs careful revision and improvement. This improvement particularly applies to the economic and social rights of the citizens. It is also consistent with contemporary trends in the modern constitutions of democratic countries, adopted after the end of World War II (France, Italy, the FRG) and, particularly, in the most recent "generation" of constitutions (Greece, Portugal, Spain), in which the economic and social rights of the citizens are assuming an increasingly important place.

Popov Comments on Factions in BSP

AU0307144191 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 28 Jun 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Miroslav Popov, cochairman of the Road to Europe Ideological Movement Coordinating Council, by Lyubomir Denov; place and date not given: "We Are Not Afraid of Bolsheviks"—first paragraph is BULGARSKA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] After the last plenum of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the ideological streams in the party, which recently calmed down, again emerged on the scene. Some people interpreted this as a "struggle for power," others as a "rebellion against Lilov, who consolidated at the top of the party," or as a sharp reaction against the "processes of re-Stalinization" in the party. Among other things, the different interpretations are a result of the lack of sufficient information on the proceedings at the plenum and its results. Miroslav Popov has his own position on that issue.

[Denov] Mr. Popov, is there a difference between the Road to Europe Movement and the Europe Social Democratic Platform parliamentary faction?

[Popov] The parliamentary faction was formed a few months ago. The movement's Coordinating Council does not act as a Politburo vis-a-vis the deputies; on the other hand, it is not the parliamentary faction of the Road to Europe. These are two separate political entities. However, both they and we support Bulgaria's Europeanization.

[Denov] Despite the fact that you are a young man, you did not join the BSP yesterday. Furthermore, you have been a member of the Road to Europe since the day it was founded. Could you outline the basic processes that are now taking place in the party?

[Popov] I think that renewal, which some people call "social democracy," is the basic process in the BSP. I must elaborate: Almost all communist parties of the former socialist countries are undergoing the process of becoming social democratic parties. What does that mean? When a party relinquishes the idea of being a "vanguard party," and of exclusively playing the "leading role" in society, and when the utopian communist dogmas are relinquished and the party heads toward daily pragmatic policy, relying on world socialist values—this for some people means undertaking the process of social-democratization. Many people already understood this, albeit intuitively, in June 1990 and voted for the BSP, not as if they were voting for the former Communist Party but for the future socialist—that is, social democratic—party.

[Denov] Do you think that Dr. Petur Dertliev would accept this definition of social democracy?

[Popov] Things with Dr. Dertliev are more complicated. This is because he leads probably the only social democratic party in Europe that is ashamed of calling itself a part of the world movement of democratic socialism. This movement (as is apparently unknown only in our country) calls itself the Socialist International. It unites three basic kinds of political parties—socialist, social democratic, and workers parties. In this sense, the difference between the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and the BSP appears to be that today the BSP is, in reality, to a large extent part of the world movement for democratic socialism, whereas the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party merely has a legal status in this movement.

[Denov] Let us concentrate on the last plenum of the BSP Supreme Council. What actually happened at the plenum?

[Popov] The BSP Presidium appeared at the plenum with an analysis of the political situation—an interesting document, toward which I have many reservations, and that proposed an alternative solution—to hold a national conference or an extraordinary congress against the background of the complex tasks the party must resolve in the coming months. Our Coordinating Council determined its position—a congress on the eve of the elections would contribute more to the isolation of the party and concentration on its internal affairs—something that, at the moment, is hardly necessary. On this point we differ significantly from the colleagues in our parliamentary faction, who issued a declaration on the necessity of holding an immediate congress.

[Denov] Why do you think Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the party, ignored the declaration of the 40 deputies? At least, this is what people are saying....

[Popov] During the plenum, Aleksandur Lilov took the floor and made an analysis that in some respects differed from the analysis of the Presidium. He obtained more categorical support on the part of the participants. I

think that his analysis better suited the complex character of the situation because it better revealed the inner logic of the political processes in our country. This was also noted by a number of the deputies mentioned earlier....

For me, the major issue, which the party unfortunately cannot understand, is that we live in a new and different society, completely different from the one that existed on 10 July 1990, for example. Today we have a different social class structure. New groups emerged, about whose existence the party apparently does not want to know anything. "Magura Street" [a Sofia street on which the main private money changers operate] is just a reflection of this new situation....

[Denov] What, in your opinion, causes this inertia?

[Popov] People sometimes speculate on this question. The same phenomenon is apparent in anything related to the attitude toward the so-called Marxist currents. Look, the leaders of those currents are mostly former lecturers on the subject of scientific communism, who today simply cannot find their way in the new situation. It is incorrect to think that they advocate a "return to Stalinism." However, behind them are many people who have been shocked by the economic situation and who have already been "thrown overboard." Naturally, they seek an explanation for their fate and for the results of implementing the reform. These are mixed-up and tormented people. To talk about "re-Stalinization" is, to put it mildly, unfounded. Sometimes, even the elementary act of preserving political willpower is described as "Stalinism." For example, this is how some people try to explain the fact that the BSP wants to win the elections....

[Denov] Does a danger of a split in the BSP exist?

[Popov] The major danger does not lie in a split in the party but in the destruction of our parliamentary group. This is so because today our society's political system is based solely on the legally elected parliament.... What we need inside the party is not unity, as some people understand it, but something more difficult to achieve—unity of action. The BSP must work out an efficient program. It must unite the different currents without obliterating them.

[Denov] What, in your opinion, must the foundation of the BSP election platform be?

[Popov] I think that the three pillars on which the platform should be based must be national unity, social security, and intellectual rebirth.

Democracy Clubs Federation Supports SDS Unity

AU0407183691 Sofia BTA in English 1741 GMT
4 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 4 (BTA)—The Federation of Democracy Clubs stands up for an undivided Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Mr. Petko Simeonov, chairman of the federation, told a press conference today.

The federation insists that the SDS should take part in the elections on a single ticket and present a single list of candidates. The federation is doing its best in this direction but, unfortunately, not everything depends on it. If the SDS decides to run with more than one list of candidates, the federation will look for support among the liberal parties and organizations inside and outside the SDS.

According to Mr. Simeonov, the federation has been maintaining close contacts with the Bulgarian Constitutional Forum ever since its foundation. "We would act together in many cases, many members of both organizations are intellectuals," Mr. Simeonov said. The setting up of an SDS-liberal platform was made public at the beginning of the week. The federation discussed it with the Green Party and Ecoglasnost, but its leadership has not yet decided whether to endorse its establishment or not.

As regards the Constitution, Mr. Simeonov said that it should be passed for "pragmatic reasons." Moreover, parliament will surely dissolve itself and new elections will be held in September. The Constitution is "essentially socialist" and unlikely to foster Bulgaria's liberal development. However, if we do not adopt it, we will have to elect another Grand National Assembly in which no political force is likely to have a two-thirds majority, Mr. Simeonov said. According to him, it is possible that the next National Assembly would get into a stalemate as well.

Trenchev Addresses Podkrea Rally in Pernik

AU0307135991 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
28 Jun 91 p 1

[Report by Svetlomira Dimitrova: "We Want To Live and Work Like Decent Human Beings"]

[Text] Pernik, which was regarded as one of the symbolic showcases of the totalitarian regime, continues to be a fortress of the red *nomenklatura*. Nevertheless, a rally of the Podkrea Labor Confederation's Territorial Union took place in that town. The meeting rallied citizens and trade unionists in their common concern about the future of Pernik's citizens. All the speakers who took the floor—including Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrea Labor Confederation; Plamen Darakchiev, Ilich Tsvetkov, and Nikolay Slatinski, deputies of the group of 39; Bogdan Kedin and Pavel Chernyski—unanimously agreed that ecology cannot be an obstacle to economic development, that excuses cannot replace an effective administration. Therefore, the main slogan of the rally was: "We want to live and work like decent human beings!"

Thousands of workers have already been dismissed, under extremely harsh conditions, and no comprehensive program has been adopted for an improvement of the difficult material situation in which the population is forced to exist. Even the bread is half-baked. In the meantime, the *nomenklatura* is still settling its accounts

and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Forces remains inactive. For this reason, Podkrepia is the only organization capable of protecting the working people. Its federations in the economic sphere are ready to join their efforts and work for a real improvement of the country's situation.

As far as those who so far received only charity are concerned, there is a way out for them, but they should try to help themselves.

Dr. Trenchev delivered an address at the rally in which he recalled the days of the general strike, when the miners supported the students on strike. The period of the election campaign is approaching. The Grand National Assembly demonstrated throughout the period of its existence that it is totally incapable of passing effective laws and of adopting a constitution. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] has already escaped from the control of certain forces that are seeking closer contacts with the Communists. Therefore, Dr. Trenchev called to the civic committees for support. We must be united to accomplish our historical mission, he said.

State Ordered To Take Over Party Archives

AU0407173391 Sofia BTA in English 1534 GMT
4 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 4 (BTA)—Party documents recording the activity of parties in the period from 1948 to November 10, 1989, will be handed over to the State Archives, the State Archive stocks do not include employees' personal files, party members' personal files and documents of local party groups, it is said in a Decree on the Storage and Use of Party Archives for the 1948-1989 Period adopted by the Council of Ministers today.

This normative act establishes a legal and democratic regime for housing the documents. Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev told the press. Mr. Ludzhev said that the government made this decision after a four-month struggle and after discussing 25 or 30 different versions. It is assumed that 1948 is the year in which the Bulgarian Communist Party turned into a totalitarian party and its archives came to be identified with the state archives.

Under the new governmental decree, each party can keep its documentation of intraparty character.

Uranium Miners Continue Underground Strike

AU0407123191 Sofia BTA in English 1135 GMT
4 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 4 (BTA)—The Struma Geological Research and Experimental Extraction Enterprise in Simitli, southwestern Bulgaria, have been on strike for the third day running, demanding the government to state whether uranium extraction will proceed in Bulgaria. Thirty-three miners have been 250 m underground since 1200 hrs [0900 GMT] yesterday. Nine more miners

joined them this morning. They together with the whole team on strike, headed by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the Podkrepia Labour Confederation and the managers of the enterprise demand only that the government answer clearly and categorically whether uranium extraction will develop in Bulgaria in the future.

The director of the Struma enterprise said that the strikers three months' wages. [sentence as received] This applies not only to workers and experts from Simitli, which has many miners' families, but also to their colleagues from Eleshnitsa who are in a lay-off, and to all collectives of the Rare Metals Company. Next Tuesday may find hundreds of miners before the Council of Ministers building. The director refuted information that the miners who spent 24 hours underground may be joined by their families. "We will not allow this," he said. But he did not conceal his concern about the men in the mines. Strikers in the galleries are receiving refreshments all the time. The medical team of the enterprise is monitoring their health. Some miners already have headaches and stomach aches but none of them wants to go out of the uranium mine. Experts advise against spending more than six to seven hours in such a place.

Term of Turkish Credit To Be Extended

AU0307082391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
29 Jun 91 p 2

[DUMA Press report: "Term of Turkish Credit May Be Extended"]

[Text] The term of Turkish credit may be extended until the end of August, and this will be the last opportunity to utilize it. The official confirmation on the part of "Eksimbank" is expected on 2 July. This was announced by Konstantin Dimitrov, chairman of the Bulgarian-Turkish Business Council.

The term of utilizing the credit expires on 30 June; however, only a few Bulgarian companies have obtained the approval of the Foreign Trade Bank. Many candidates have been eliminated because they could not present bank guarantees or contracts on marketing their production.

The talks on extending the term were conducted during the visit of the Bulgarian delegation to Turkey. The Bulgarian-Turkish Business Council had interceded with "Eksimbank" and requested an extension of the term, Mr. Dimitrov said.

Finance Minister Kostov Discusses Reforms

91BA07354 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
13, 15 May 91

[Statement by Finance Minister Ivan Kostov to DEMOKRATSIYA; date unknown: "If the Start Had Been More Radical, We Would Have Achieved More"]

[13 May pp 1, 5]

[Text]

Prices

Essentially, the Bulgarian reform began on 1 February as a liberalization of a significant percentage of commodity prices (90 percent of the prices in terms of real turnover) and is currently registering the first positive changes in price levels and price ratios. After their drastic rise in February by about 120 percent, a drop of almost one-half followed in March. In April, according to statistical data (this is the increase of the so-called big consumer basket, which includes 1,700 commodities), the rise of inflation declined by about 20 percent. The growth of retail trade prices was roughly the same.

The very speedy control established over the process of price inflation was paralleled by changes in price ratios. For the time being, changes in consumer demand are indeed quite negative in terms of the falling behind of high-quality, yet expensive, food products and the consolidation of demand concerning prime necessity goods. The consequence of this is a pressure exerted on the entire price system—that is, generally speaking, prices in April showed a low inflationary rise, and favorable features were noted in the internal restructuring.

Income

After numerous indexings and compensations, the dynamics followed by income was as follows: In February, it fell behind prices: By the end of the month, the initial compensations were paid to the pensioners; it was only in March, with a delay of about one month, that the initial compensations to employed people were paid. The consequence was a significant disparity between the substantial increase in prices and income compensations in March and April, and it is only now that we can undertake the full indexing and compensation as stipulated by the Tripartite Commission. This means that, regardless of the February shock, which was absorbed by the population—above all, with its own commodity reserves and good preparations—consumption gradually became adapted to the price system imposed by the market. Particularly favorable changes occurred in the group of the 14 commodities kept under observation, the prices of which dropped by more than 14 percent and which continued to decline in March and April. The prices of the most necessary goods are being gradually stabilized. As a result of this, they have fallen drastically behind the prices of durable goods.

It is becoming possible for income to gradually stabilize and even to show some increase. However, real population consumption has dropped exceptionally—by about 40-50 percent. This drastic reduction in consumption is being felt by all Bulgarian citizens. However, with such a compensation system, disparity between minimal and maximal wages has been reduced drastically, putting, above all, a burden on people with high incomes because the compensations were based on the level of the social

minimum—in other words, the loss of the purchasing power and actual consumption raises with the growth of income. Currently, a contributing factor to this effect is the scale of general income taxation.

In my view, positive changes have taken place, except for the fact that the most responsible and most reliable strata in the administration, enterprises, banks, and financial establishments have come dangerously close, in terms of their income, to the lowest paid population strata. This leads to the danger that, in a couple of months, these people will lose their motivation to work and deprive us of the opportunity to benefit from their truly great possibilities. Yet, they are our most skilled manpower.

Speaking of income, it would be proper to mention pensions and social security, in which we note a drastic process of equalization between minimal and maximal pensions. Today, all pensions are virtually identical. The result is (may the pensioners forgive me!) something like a dead heat. In the final segment of their lives, the people have become almost equal in terms of income. Therefore, our pension system has become very similar to insurance payments. I do not think, however, that this is a very negative process. On the contrary, I believe that the previous striking disparities in pensions (by a factor of more than 20) could no longer be considered normal.

Considering the particular way in which the economy has reacted—that is, by increasing the similarity between real and nominal income—it was able to avoid high unemployment. Minimal wages were provided, and, in a number of areas, the people were given paid or unpaid leave. That is why unemployment was not felt so drastically during the first three months. For the time being, there are some 160,000 unemployed, or about 4 percent of the total number of employed people.

One could consider this process as favorable. It is a specific reaction: The economy reacts to the drastic drop in the possibility of finding jobs with a lowering of income. This is like an equal distribution of the burden. Naturally, this is a temporary solution that cannot last too long because, once again, we are faced with the question of who would rescue us from this situation. The economy must begin to revive. However, it will revive only with the help of those sufficiently motivated to work.

The Interest Rate

The increase in our interest rates outstripped that of prices. They rose as early as in January. Subsequently, they rose by 45 percent and remained at that level for quite some time. Interest rates proved to be an adequate or almost adequate instrument for controlling price dynamics.

This is a strange effect of our reform. The somewhat high interest rate was able to control an incredibly fast price inflation. This could be explained by the fact that, first of all, the "price inflation" disease is not chronic—that is, there was no period of superinflation in Bulgaria.

Second, there was a very interesting national phenomenon: the high savings rate. It turned out that a 3.5-percent interest rate on monthly deposits (about 36 percent of the annual interest) was able to keep within the State Savings Bank a substantial amount of money. The increase in interest rates on old loans, which was quite low, made it possible to repay a significant percentage of the loans. This indicates that, the more painful the solutions to the reform are, the more favorable are its results.

The fluctuation of the interest rate creates major difficulties for the companies during periods of price inflation. The inflation was weak, particularly in April, when (on a monthly basis) our country finally had a positive interest rate. The money was already worth something! This was an exceptionally interesting phenomenon, which was a favorable one in terms of healing the monetary system and, in general, the financial system, the banks, and bank credit. The fact that we came close to the true interest rate enabled us to clearly identify the incredibly difficult problems facing enterprises in debt. This applies to the state budget debt.

The Rate of Exchange

The rate of exchange showed a very fast decline trend immediately after the partial liberalization of the foreign exchange market. It reached 14 leva to the dollar and, subsequently, very slowly, with fluctuations, it rose to more than 19 leva, after which it once again dropped to 18.5 leva. The fact that it did not reach high digits—that is, that the leva was not devalued once again—indicates that we have mastered the process involving the rate of exchange. In all likelihood, it will not have the value of which we dreamed. It turned out that that dream of ours was without foundation and that the potential for inflation and depreciation of the national currency had been incredibly high. We are now noticing a certain stabilization of the rate on the level of 18.5 leva to the dollar.

It is quite likely that this rate was also influenced by the rise of the value of the dollar as compared to the other currencies on the international market. The dollar rose everywhere, and the fact that we are gauging everything in terms of the rate of exchange of the dollar presumes that our rate may be influenced by the overall rise in the exchange rate of the dollar.

To me, the quotation at the Bank of Vienna is an interesting phenomenon. Several days ago, it was putting a rate of exchange of the dollar that was higher by one leva, as compared to our own rate. The average rate was 17.30 leva, with a rather substantial margin: buying at 19.50 and selling at 15.50 leva to the dollar.

Another interesting aspect is the volume of sales of foreign exchange on our international bank market. On the surface, it may appear that the sale is not intensive. It turned out, however, that the volume of purchased currencies was in excess of \$130 million of sold currencies over \$170 million for the period from 19 February on. The amount of \$170 million of purchased foreign

exchange accounts for almost 45 percent of the foreign currency that was spent to pay for imports during the same period. This indicates that the role of the foreign exchange market in terms of our imports is quintessential, starting with the very first phase of the reform.

The Financial Condition of the Firms

The firms, which were in good condition at the beginning of the year and until February, gradually began to feel quite uncomfortable, exposed as they were to serious and already firm financial restrictions and firm tax restrictions. All of this led to fast losses of liquidity: a reduction in the monetary mass with which they could operate and a reduced opportunity to maneuver with available funds. The leva is becoming increasingly more expensive, and it will be difficult for them to have levas at their disposal in the future.

The financial condition of the firms, at least as far as their leva resources is concerned, becomes the basis and the reason that would force them to find a solution to this situation. A solution has already become apparent. The firms have considerable reserves of unsold goods (over 3 billion leva more than they had at the start of the year). The commodity stocks accumulated in domestic trade are in excess of 2.7 billion leva. Reserves of materials have increased, as well. Clearly, some firms are experiencing major difficulties in selling their goods. They have no orders and they are in debt.

Regardless of their difficult financial condition, the firms have converted significant amounts of their cash into monetary deposits. In other words, they are seeking an interest on the deposits as a partial solution of the situation.

The most unpleasant feature in the financial condition of the firms is their reciprocal obligations. They are not settling accounts with each other. An internal intercompany credit appears, the conditions of which are probably more favorable as compared to bank credits, which enables the firms to have greater financial maneuverability.

The enterprises have not completed the process of reassessing material stocks and, in general, turnover capital, precisely because of the difficulty in finding markets. As a result of strict control, loans for working capital have increased insignificantly, and loans for capital investments have declined. These are the favorable consequences of the strict control over the monetary mass in circulation and another manifestation of the process of the increased price of the Bulgarian leva.

We should not equate a strong monetary system with the good situation of enterprises. A strong monetary system is a prerequisite for truly good financial health of enterprises, whereas the opposite is wrong. We know that enterprises could survive in rather good material and resource condition even in a virtually collapsed monetary system, such as the one we inherited.

Our reform is going through the necessary stage of a strong monetary system.

We should point out that a time is coming that will prove to be crucial to the reform. Economic managers and the personnel of enterprises and firms, aware of the fact that they themselves must find a solution to a very difficult economic situation, will do what is necessary and will indeed solve the easier problem: helping their enterprise survive, finding a market for its goods, and improving quality and discipline. These are things that are directly related to an enterprise and are familiar to all countries as prerequisites for leaving a crisis behind, reducing unnecessary expenditures, instituting strict conservation of raw and other materials and electric power, drastically upgrading quality, and reducing defects. In the past, there was a great deal of talk, but precisely the opposite was taking place.

There are two things that are causing serious upheavals in the financial condition of the firms and that put them up against the wall. First is the drastic limitation in real consumption by the population. Second is the drastic reduction (again by more than one-half) of exports. Excluding capital investments, which have strongly declined (that is, investment demand has dropped perhaps most drastically), we notice in the search for goods a very substantial drop, which makes this upheaval quite likely. This defines the difficulties in the financial status of the firms. Under these circumstances, the decisive factor is, who will be the fastest to restructure and who will find the way to the market.

A way to the market will exist and does exist at this point.

The Financial Condition of the Population—Savings and Loans

The population's savings remained almost intact during the months of the dramatic crisis. There was only a slight transfer of savings from the DSK [State Savings Bank] to the commercial banks, based on the anticipated better deposit terms. What was most remarkable was that, despite the low interest rate, based on the old systems, the population overfulfilled the program concerning its obligations. In terms of housing loans, 1.66 million leva had been repaid by 30 April; in terms of current loans, 550 million leva—or more than 2 billion, if we ignore funds transfers—had been repaid. The population repaid more than one-third of its debts, which is an exceptionally favorable fact and new proof of the inordinately strong tendency to save. This is a fact that does not need any particular comment. Even during very hard times for the family, the people are choosing the right strategy of lowering their indebtedness and increasing their savings, which will give them opportunities in the future. In addition, they have restricted themselves beyond the level of the limitations imposed by changes in prices and incomes. This is very farsighted and very proper. It is universally known that one can resolve the crisis not by

consuming more but by saving and investing. The population is setting the example in this area.

[15 May p 4]

[Text]

The State Budget

The situation with the state budget appeared to be quite poor at the start of the reform. One could say that the budget was the one that paid the highest price for this start by losing a significant percentage of its ordinary revenue for the first quarter and being forced to drastically curtail expenditures. Budget revenue was on the order of 7-8 percent for the republic budget and about 10-11 percent for the state budget (a percentage of the annual revenue). One-quarter of the year has already passed—that is, revenue should have reached some 20 percent. However, because of the particularly difficult conditions, the strange month of January and the shock month of February, and the normalizing in March, revenue should have reached the 12-13 percent level. Yet the state budget revenue is about 10-11 percent, which is quite low. In practice, this means nonimplementation of the revenue program for the budget and conceals major prerequisites for its destabilization.

For the objectives set in the program of the Letter of Intent, which was coordinated with the International Monetary Fund, to be implemented—which, in turn, was a prerequisite for gaining outside support for our reform—we had to pledge drastic reductions in expenditures. Anything that could have been postponed and not paid we postponed and did not pay. As a result, we were able to keep the budget deficit within admissible limits.

The only failure that was more serious occurred in the budget of the state social security, which is relatively independent. Despite the received subsidies, as stipulated by the Law on the State Budget, the state social security at present shows a substantial nonfulfillment of revenues and a significant increase in expenditures. The pensions and compensations paid out exceed by about 1.2-1.3 billion leva the funds at the disposal of the budget. The reasons are two: On the one hand, it is the populist policy of many deputies in the VNS [Grand National Assembly] and of the parliament at large, who gave their blessings to the further (in my view totally unjustified) liberalizing of pension conditions. The latest was the pensioning of teachers. At the same time, the government, forced by the Tripartite Commission, engaged in significant compensations for pensions, not selectively and not depending on the type of family, age, and need, but in general. Considering the extreme scarcity, this punched a hole in the budget of the state social security.

The second reason is that, because of a weakening of financial discipline, a large number of enterprises are not making their payments to the state social security and

unemployment compensation. That which the enterprises should contribute to social security the state social security system is forced to borrow from the bank in order to give to the people. It is borrowing that money at a high rate of interest that should be paid by those who, by law, should make the social security payments. A totally abnormal situation has developed in our country, and I think that my colleagues at the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare will do what is necessary to ensure that the payments are made in the normal way, regardless of the fact that this could even worsen the financial condition of the enterprises. The truth is that the drastic changes in price levels and the repeated price increases led to a repeated and relative decline of enterprise indebtedness. This should absolutely not be ignored.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare could impose penalties, as do the tax authorities, in order to ensure payments. Some inspectors are specifically charged with controlling the amounts and the payment of social security fees. Such people should begin to do their jobs and take care of their obligations.

Imports and Exports

Imports have declined by 50 percent and exports by 40 percent. For the first time in many years, we have a positive balance in trade operations, particularly in a Western direction (this applies to total imports and exports as observed by the MFTIVr [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations]). Bulgaria exported goods worth \$539 million in a Western direction and imported goods totaling \$497 million. The trade balance in the first direction was positive, as well.

We are noticing an initial, albeit very weak, favorable effect of the reform in foreign trade. Imports have become very expensive under the new conditions: It is very expensive to import, and particularly to import carelessly, as had been the case so far, and it is very profitable to export. Compared to last year, exports to the West declined by no more than slightly over 6 percent. Overall exports dropped by 40 percent and by no more than 6-7 percent in the so-called second direction. As a result of this, the percentage of trade in the second direction increased sharply. This, too, is a very favorable situation in foreign trade but, naturally, it is taking place on a most horrifying level, under the conditions of an extreme scarcity. However, this is a healthy scarcity that is very difficult for the economy, but no one can deny that it is healthy. The fact that there is such persistent behavior proves that the liberalization of foreign trade and the elimination of state monopoly in foreign trade and the opening of a foreign exchange market are yielding results. A drastic reduction of trade would, in any case, have taken place because of the breakdown of CEMA and of the old mechanisms of trade with the former East European countries and the Soviet Union. It is being replaced by a mechanism that, in addition to everything else, is having a small but encouraging positive effect.

Foreign trade has some phenomena that are particularly threatening to the reform. First is the substantial price differentials that must be absorbed by the budget in importing goods that are sold at fixed prices. For the first four months alone, we must pay out more than 1.5 billion leva in price differentials. By the end of the year, unless the situation changes, such payments will be in excess of 10 billion leva. Price differentials come from, above all, the import of petroleum and electric power. Today one kilowatt-hour [kwh] of electric power costs 5.18 kopeks, if not more. If you compute it on the basis of the actual market rate of exchange, you can see how much one little kwh of electric power coming from the Soviet Union is costing. We have imported in excess of 1,200 billion kwh.

All of this develops into a dangerous subsidy in terms of covering price differentials, which are simply unbearable. The subsidies for imports, for unfinished operations in convertible rubles in order to repay the negative balance of payment of Bulgaria toward the other East European countries, is of the same nature. In this case, the budget contributes 2.40 leva per transferable ruble of export and has no way of compensating for this amount because this is used exclusively to maintain the balance of payments. Therefore, we must absolutely succeed in increasing Bulgarian exports.

The Foreign Debt

I believe that it would be no exaggeration to say that, for the first time, we have the feeling that we are controlling the country's foreign debt. The initial features of controlling the foreign debt appeared after those terrible things that occurred after the moratorium, and the subsequent isolation of the country. The initial symptom was the success of our delegation at the Paris Club, which achieved an agreement for rescheduling our debt to the Paris Club—that is, 15 percent of the debt has already been settled in practice. Bulgaria was given the opportunity to reopen one of the channels—the official channel through which other states and international organizations provide loans. This is a major success in controlling the foreign debt. It was achieved on a highly professional and very competent level. This is a truly excellent success achieved by our participants in the talks and in terms of the country as a whole.

The creation of a precedent in settling Bulgaria's debt to the Paris Club helps in settling the question of the London Club, of which the lending banks are members. It will now become easier to establish the approximately same basic conditions for the banks that are members of the London Club and look for the same type of solution. Furthermore, in the past, our delegation had been able to talk to the London Club about dropping its own option for settling the matter, which involved granting preliminary guarantees by Bulgaria covering a two-year period. We asked for another option, according to which we assumed the obligation of drafting a program for paying

our debts and signing an agreement with the commercial lending banks, and guaranteeing such a program so that it could be enacted.

We believe that the probable settling of the foreign debt problem with the London Club will not restore Bulgaria's credit possibilities in its dealings with commercial banks on a mass scale. However, it will make it possible, in the future, for such indebtedness to be planned and for us to formulate a program for preparing our economy for gradual changes in indebtedness terms because, although for the time being we are not paying anything on it, we have no illusions that this situation will continue in the future. No one will tolerate a country that declares a lasting moratorium on its payments. Bulgaria must be prepared for the time when it will begin to pay. What matters is that matters are no longer as tragically inevitable and hopeless as they were when the new government took over because such agreements have already been reached and an approach adopted for settling the debt, and it is obvious that, with it, preparations are also started for assuming real control over the country's foreign debt.

It is important to point out that our country neither demands nor believes it should demand forgiveness of the debt, that some of it be "forgotten." Our behavior is explained by a number of circumstances, and we do not believe we are in a position to demand what Poland, for example, is demanding. We also realize that we are not in a position to do what Hungary is doing.

In all cases, we are seeking a position that will completely lift the barriers blocking Bulgaria, despite the fact that the trade flows and the participation of the banks in the crediting of Bulgarian foreign trade operations will, in all likelihood, develop slowly. However, I sense from the talks with the different banks that have extended credit and with some Western institutions that are guaranteeing export loans that the restoration of Bulgaria's trade credits could turn out to be not that difficult.

In practical terms, the question of new loans is one of increasing the indebtedness of the country. In the first four months of the reform, our country did not increase its foreign debt. The balance of payments, on the basis of the roughest possible computations for the three months, was almost achieved because the \$42 million we earned as a surplus of exports over imports [as published] is compensated by attracting on the foreign exchange market some \$40 million. It is likely that the situation in April will be similar or even better, or that the new credits the country so badly needs could cautiously promote Bulgarian economic attractiveness. In other words, we must draw as little as possible on foreign credits to enhance the country's imports and exports. We must improve matters in such a way that exports outstrip imports. This will have a very favorable impact on the country's economic situation.

This task seems clear but in no case should it result in further indebtedness, based on the old system, without

the formulation of a mechanism for the repayment of loans. For quite some time we have been discussing the creation of a domestic reconstruction and development fund, which would assume, at a later date, the servicing of the foreign debt.

It is precisely the wish not to block access to new loans that makes us reject some offers by the EC, suggesting that Bulgaria demand a forgiveness of its debts by the commercial banks. We know that if we do this we shall block our path to other commercial banks forever, or at least for a very long time, for decades into the future, or in just the situation in which we are at present. We are therefore undertaking:

To Draw Conclusions From the Many Facts of the Economic Reform

My conclusions may sound somewhat strange, but not in terms of what we have experienced because it is clear that we are experiencing a great deal of privation. And not about what we have accomplished because (as can be seen everywhere we look) we have not achieved all that much. I would like to draw conclusions about some things that proved to be exceptionally important in terms of the way Bulgarian has begun its reform.

We can see the highest possible drop in real consumption as compared with our projections. The fact that the population accepted such a great decline in real consumption speaks of a very serious, a pragmatic, attitude on the part of the people toward life. Some may immediately say that there was no other choice. Yet a great deal could have been done. For example, such people could have taken to the streets and overthrown the government, bringing down the National Assembly or doing many other things. The fact that the people accepted it provided a small chance for the reform because this played the role of a strong stabilizing factor in terms of the foreign exchange rate and the prices. In practice, it is precisely the adoption of such limited actual consumption that guarantees the attainment of some exceptionally important objectives during the first phase.

The second small reserve (we have no major reserves) is that we overfulfilled yet another program: the program of limiting the mass of money. Actually, it is these two factors that controlled price inflation in April. At the present time, with the new prices, we have virtually the same M1 and M2 aggregates (that is, money in circulation and money in the form of cash deposits) with which we started. This creates the very difficult monetary-market atmosphere in the country. However, it is precisely the harsh monetary-market atmosphere, with its terrible laws, that the enterprises and the population must adapt to. Actually, this is the market at its most terrible and its harshest. Although incomplete, from the monetary viewpoint, that is what the market is.

It is precisely this, the fact that we were able to control the growth of the monetary mass, that has preserved the small possibility of revival. We can revive consumer

demand, and we can make the situation on the credit market more dynamic with a slightly more liberal policy concerning monetary restrictions. This means that what we have so far overfulfilled has developed into a small reserve for the next phase.

We should not fail to mention one of the major conditions for a stable start of our reform, despite the exceptionally difficult conditions: It is the high, the extraordinarily high, rate of savings. Despite the seeming inappropriateness, the people were able to repay substantial loans without reducing their savings. Their behavior proved to be the real foundation for the reform. In the future, as well, we shall rely on this special feature of the Bulgarian monetary market and the attitude of the Bulgarian people toward monetary income. The stakes are very high. There are economies that, for a number of years now, have been trying to increase the rate of savings. If we were to retain this attitude toward money as shown by the population today, this will be a guarantee for the future.

Finally, the main conclusion: Has the first phase achieved its objectives?

Yes, as far as the foreign economy is concerned—and the elimination of foreign economic isolation and the restoration of some trust in our country. This is something of exceptional importance to the future development of the reform.

No, as far as reaching the final objectives of improvements in the financial and monetary areas is concerned. The budget remains under extraordinary stress and cannot provide us with even minimal freedom to maneuver in the future phase of the reform. The situation would have been different, for example, if the first phase had ended as did the increase in prices on 28 November 1979. The price increase at that time was manifested in a significant increase in budget revenue, which, in turn, went into some capital investments, such as the building of new plants. Unfortunately, in our country, no such effect was obtained or will be obtained. Consequently, the flexibility of the budget is limited and that of the banks greatly restricted because of the many difficult, hopeless, and noncollectible loans. This goes to show that, although we are completing the first three months with some successes, we have not attained the final result: total control of inflation.

In all cases, however, bearing in mind all the prerequisites that were created by the initial stage of the reform, we can say that they are sufficient to provide a successful outcome during the second phase.

SFRY Envoy Warns on Change in Stance

LD0407183691 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] This afternoon in Prague Zdenek Matejka, Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister, briefed Stojan Stojanovic, Yugoslav ambassador to Czechoslovakia, about the stance taken by the Czechoslovak Government on the development of the situation in Yugoslavia.

Stojan Stojanovic interpreted the Czechoslovak Government's stance as marking a certain shift from a speech delivered by President Havel yesterday. In this context the Yugoslav representative indicated that the weakening of the emphasis put on the territorial unity of Yugoslavia—as he perceives the new Czechoslovak stance—could have a negative influence on Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations, said Egon Lansky [spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs].

Parliament Passes Law on Freedom of Religion

LD0407155791 Prague CTK in English 1233 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 4 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly today passed a law on freedom of religion and the status of religious orders and congregations, allowing the establishment of religious schools with their own curriculum and health and social service programmes.

The new law, which takes effect as of September 1, is intended to enable churches and religious groups to fulfill their mission by setting up orthodox schools and universities to instruct and educate its own spiritual and lay workers. Persons engaged in spiritual pursuits, however, will retain access to public social services, health care and children's homes, among others.

The law also provides for the registration of these groups with the Czech or Slovak governments.

In other business, the parliament failed to pass an amendment on the property rights of religious orders and congregations and of the archbishopric of Olomouc.

The amendment was rejected by both the Czech and Slovak chambers of the 150-member House of Nations. If passed, it would have required the state to return another 198 buildings to religious groups throughout the country.

One hundred buildings were to be returned to the orders under the original law of July 1990, 78 of which have already been handed back.

A total of 900 monasteries and convents were confiscated in April 1950 under the communist regime.

Havel Appoints New Security Information Director

LD0507093791 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 1630 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] President Vaclav Havel, on the basis of a proposal of the Federal Government, appointed Jiri Novotny acting director of the Federal Security Information Service. A letter of appointment was presented to him by Prime Minister Marian Calfa today.

Klaus on Czech-Slovak Negotiations

91CH0677B Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Jun 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus by Karel Hvizdala; place and date not given: "It Is Necessary To Tell the Truth"]

[Text] [Hvizdala] When you were establishing the Civic Democratic Party, did you contemplate regarding its federal structure and then state, regarding the sentence uttered by Jan Carnogursky that "Slovakia will stay in the federation only until the moment we enter Europe": that it is necessary to erect a barricade against such ideas? Have you changed your attitudes toward Slovakia or was this actually a provocation and an attempt to intimidate the Slovaks?

[Klaus] First, the Civic Democratic Party is and will be consistent with regard to its considerations of the federation. We have not changed our views even by a millimeter. Views are shifting on the Slovak side and this is what led me to the necessity to raise the voice, the tone, as well as the form. I am fundamentally opposed to trial marriages. Imagine that we would tell the wife that I shall marry her now, but when I find someone better she should be prepared for my leaving her. I wanted to clearly state that no one can conduct themselves this way, either in a marriage or in relationships between states.

[Hvizdala] In what respect is the sentence uttered by Mr. Carnogursky different? After all, he has been making such claims for several months?

[Klaus] I believe that the sentences heard from Slovakia are shifting and I am not alone in that belief. This is the common opinion in our party. An analysis of the utterances by individual Slovak politicians regarding the federation, however, would exceed the framework of this interview. I repeat: We consider the conclusion of a state treaty to be a marriage for a certain period of time. That is unacceptable.

[Hvizdala] What position will your party take today regarding the constitutional negotiations at Kromeriz? What are you taking there?

[Klaus] We are going to Kromeriz with a desire not to exacerbate confrontational moods. And, like always, I would like to contribute to the substantive character of

negotiations. A second matter about which I would like to speak has to do with the procedural question. Following the revolution, the game is played in an institution referred to as "round tables" and this institution was necessary because parliament was not functioning and it took care of standard political mechanisms. As an exception, it is possible to accept it as a meeting of political leaders who then provide the impulse for their parliamentary clubs. I understand that and that is why I always participated in these negotiations, but it seems to me that negotiations of this type have already outlived their usefulness. The main task today is to return all of these negotiations regarding constitutions to parliamentary ground as soon as possible because justified fears already threaten our voters—fears that a legitimately elected parliament is being circumvented. It is necessary to say this out loud.

And thirdly, I was by far not a witness to all of the Vikry-Lany-Budmerice events, but, nevertheless, my feeling is that virtually the same thing occurred each time: A communique which was formulated was more optimistic in its essence than was the actual course of negotiations. In essence, each of these communiques concealed serious disputes and we would therefore recommend that communiques fully reflect the actual course of negotiations as well as the entire atmosphere.

[Hvizdala] However, you cannot assign the blame for this to anyone else. If, as a participant in the negotiations, you did not agree with this optimistic formulation, then it had to sound differently....

[Klaus] I am not criticizing anyone; I am only stating that it is high time to abandon these practices. What is involved is that we should issue actual communiqus and not statesmanlike communiqus. I believe that it is necessary to tell the public the truth.

[Hvizdala] How would you specify the political and economic limits beyond which you and your party would not go during these negotiations?

[Klaus] These are two different things. One matter is procedural and the second is substantive. I must say that, for the time being, none of these negotiations dealt with any serious questions. The matter of jurisdictions and such matters has virtually never come up there.

[Hvizdala] What do they speak about there then?

[Klaus] There is constant talk of procedural questions. The actual essence of the constitutions is addressed very sparsely. I would say that there was talk only of the preamble paragraphs. What was involved was how to harmonize three constitutions, which to approve first, which is subordinate to which one? But hardly a word was heard about what the taxes would be like, how the petroleum pipelines would be divided, etc. And, perhaps, this is also correct because those substantive jurisdictional matters should be solved by specialists.... If you now, therefore, ask about the jurisdictional side, then this is a premature debate.

[Hvizdala] Do you and your party have any kind of notions of limitations beyond which you would not go as a matter of principle?

[Klaus] I would put it this way: A condition is an actual federation, a single monetary unit, and a single central bank based on that fact. On the other hand, I would like to say that some federal matters are dwelled upon more than is healthy.

[Hvizdala] For example?

[Klaus] For example, the law on waste was just now discussed and what was involved was whether it should be a federal law or a nonfederal law. I thought this was unnecessary and I see an unhealthy federal purism in back of it. I see no fragmentation of the federation as a result of differing views regarding the quantities of harmful agents which may exist, say, in one ton of water. It seems to me that we have not recognized where the common federal interests lie and where they do not and that is why both republics, from time to time, shield themselves and close themselves off in their bunkers and dispatch well-aimed missiles at the other side. And I believe that a number of these projectiles are totally superfluous.

[Hvizdala] Let us return to politics.

[Klaus] In terms of foreign policy and foreign economic policy, the federation must act as a single entity; there may be no doubt of this—it must not be the subject of discussion. It is definitely out of the question for one of the republics to conclude its own agreements with international monetary funds and international banks. Moreover, it must be said that there must be a unified monetary and fiscal policy. It is not possible for one budget to support an anti-inflationary policy and another to support a proinflationary policy—that is clear. On the other hand, it is possible for certain buffers to exist with respect to the overwhelming majority of taxes and, within the framework of this corridor, the republics can move about on their own as they see fit, etc., etc. It is not possible to specify everything.

[Hvizdala] On Wednesday, you will be 50 years old; what would you wish for yourself?

[Klaus] A person truly needs health and strength. That is banal, but it is so. Now, my Achilles tendons have begun hurting—it has been two to three weeks already—they even wanted to put me in a plaster cast and I am a little nonplussed by that. That is why I would mainly wish for good health.

[Hvizdala] And in politics?

[Klaus] I am, of course, aware of the fact that the Civic Democratic Party is, today, the sole sponsor of the embarked upon direction in Czechoslovakia and, therefore, it is a duty of that party to assure that development and this is only possible as a result of express election successes—something which I would wish myself as well as this country.

[Hvizdala] And when will you begin the election campaign? Have you already been criticized for having begun?

[Klaus] Here, everyone is engaged in the election campaign through each step taken and every speech made. In a certain sense, the election campaign never ended here, but, on the other hand, I believe it would be beneficial for us if we gave everybody a little time off from politics because it is not possible to hold an entire nation in political suspense for so long.

Message of Slovak Foundation to Slovenia, Croatia

1U0407144091 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
3 Jul 91 p 2

[Unattributed article in the "Briefly From Home" column]

[Text] On 28 June, the Slovak Heritage Foundation sent a telegram to Slovenian Republic Prime Minister Lojze Peterle and Croatian Republic Prime Minister Josip Manolic, which contains the following: "The Slovak Heritage Foundation received with complete understanding the declaration of the state sovereignty and independence of your Republic, which expresses the will of its citizens. We hope that the natural right of national and state self-determination will become the keystone in the building of a democratic and pluralistic Europe. We wish your citizens great success in forming their statehood, which will certainly become a positive contribution to the development of not only your Republic but of Europe and of European integration."

Poll Compares National Views With Poland, Hungary

91CJ06761 Prague RESPEKT in Czech
2 Jun 91 pp 7-8

[Interview with Mark Boguszak, director of the Association for Independent Social Analysis, by Ivan Lamp; place and date not given: "The Worst Is Still To Come—What Central Europe Fears and Hopes"—first paragraph is RESPEKT introduction]

[Text] Following the democratic changes in central and East Europe, interest in this region increased in the West. Not only politicians and businessmen, but even normal citizens are asking: How has life changed behind the Iron Curtain, what kind of notions do people have regarding the future? So much from the introductory passage of an extensive public opinion poll which took place in April 1991 simultaneously in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The poll was prepared and directed by the American Freedom House Foundation, in collaboration with teams of sociologists. It resulted in a unique set of information regarding the current status of these post-communist societies. In Czechoslovakia, data were collected and evaluated by the Association for Independent

Social Analysis (AISA). What results did it produce? We shall find this out from its director, Mark Boguszak.

[Lamp] Did any specific parallels or differences show up with regard to developments in our country, in Hungary, and in Poland?

[Boguszak] All three countries are in the same historical situation today: None of them has as yet definitively cut the umbilical cord which ties it to the communist system and all of them are struggling with great difficulties. The majority of their citizens are aware that the current economic situation is extremely bad and they do not expect any specific improvements in the coming months. However, there are differences. Schematically spoken: whereas Poland is already out of the worst crisis and whereas Hungary is standing within it, feet first, Czechoslovakia is still heading in that direction. It was the last to begin and set out on the relatively shortest path. The majority of the Czechoslovak population continues to be convinced that the crisis, which must be passed through, will not be excessively deep and that it will be possible to survive it without major changes in the approach to life and work. The Hungarians and Poles have already overcome this naive belief.

Fears

[Lamp] Is it possible to see from the data what it is that central Europeans fear the most today?

[Boguszak] Further increases in prices—this is something which the entire monitored region agrees upon. Surprisingly, they fear unemployment least of all.

[Lamp] And they do not fear a revolution?

[Boguszak] Not a revolution, but rather anarchy and chaos. The Czechoslovak data set indicates that the majority of the population absolutely does not think that the old system could show up here. However, there are great fears regarding the failure of the economic reform.

[Lamp] What is behind that?

[Boguszak] We lack any kind of experience involving a market economy. For the most part, citizens have no idea what the new system will bring them. They somehow know abstractly that it leads to prosperity in the West and, somehow abstractly, are in favor, but that is all for the time being. In actual fact, they are not even convinced by far that a market is actually the best they could have. The absolutely greatest barrier is fear that whoever made decisions for us will suddenly be lost and that we will have to take over responsibility. People are lacking in confidence that, after overcoming the crisis status, the change will result in benefits, even for themselves personally.

One-third of the inhabitants of the Czech Republic and more than one-half of the inhabitants of Slovakia believe that not everyone will benefit from a market economy, but only a small group of people. Naturally, this is also reflected in attitudes toward individual elements of the

market system. For example, the majority of citizens agrees with privatization, but only at a theoretical, nonpersonal level. However, they are already beginning to be bothered by the thought that their neighbor suddenly acquired, let us say, a factory.

Connected with this is also a relatively large degree of resistance to investments and ownership rights by foreigners. Only 40 percent of the Czechoslovak population believes that the right of foreigners to invest here in enterprises and to own them should be part and parcel of our economic system.

[Lamp] Because such a large percentage of people do not believe that a transition to a market economy would benefit them, how do they view the changes which have thus far taken place in the economic sphere?

[Boguszak] Highly critically and even pessimistically. Virtually one-half of our citizens believes that things were better before the free elections. On a personal level, only 8 percent said their economic situation was better than it was prior to the elections; 58 percent consider it to be worse, and the remainder say it has not changed. If we compare this with a slightly optimistic Poland and the overwhelming numbers for Hungary, then we clearly see the parting of the ways out of and into the crisis about which we spoke in the beginning. The federal numbers for Czechoslovakia, however, are distorted by the specific difference between the attitudes of the population of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. For example, 67 percent of the population of the Slovak Republic believes that the situation after the elections is worse than it was before, whereas for the Czech Republic the numbers only indicate 37 percent believe that. Economic, political, and social problems are far more express in Slovakia; Slovakia finds itself much more deeply in crisis than is the case for the Czech Republic.

Conceptions

[Lamp] How is this very critical attitude toward economic developments reflected in political attitudes? Do people perhaps wish for a return to communism?

[Boguszak] For the time being, no. With the exception of approximately 10 percent, the decisive majority of the citizenry absolutely rejects the past, which is connected with a totalitarian regime. The pessimism in viewing the situation of the day is not motivated politically, but by the fact that the lives of people were dominated by material fears and apprehension that the standard of living will decline. There is the effort to somehow extricate oneself from any kind of difficulties, which can be seen from the fact that, while political changes were considered as being "too rapid" by 28 percent of citizens (22 percent in the Czech Republic, 40 percent in the Slovak Republic), changes in the economy are thought to be "too rapid" by 40 percent of the inhabitants (32 percent for the Czech Republic, 55 percent for the Slovak Republic).

Despite the fact that after the revolution, society sensed that this country was devastated, there was a lack of recognition of the fact that it was devastated totally. In terms of their everyday worries, people do not give a lot of thought as to who caused the situation and are losing any connection between individual reform steps and the final positive goal. They do not believe that things could not have been done in another way, less painfully. But a referendum on the question as to whether we should return to the status ante or go forward would, most likely, end with the clear victory for the second variant.

[Lamp] From the numbers, it is clear that the choice as to how to proceed forward is perhaps also not as clear.

[Boguszak] Yes, the notions regarding the final goal are quite broad. Relatively large popularity (36 percent) is attributed to the vision of some kind of "mixed economy," which would, in addition to market principles, place emphasis primarily on well-known social confidences and upon a state-guaranteed standard of living. Altogether, although virtually half of the citizens of the CSFR votes for a pure market economy, the difference between the republics is marked (53 percent in the Czech Republic, 39 percent in Slovakia). This already indicates that a referendum would end up differently in both parts of the state. And even if it is actually valid that, on a federal average, the decisive majority of the population tends to reject the totalitarian past, Slovakia is already beginning to show a discernible tie-in between the criticism of the economic impact of the reform and the political direction. A part of the citizenry of the Slovak Republic which cannot be ignored (20-30 percent) is, at the very least, contemplating today whether things were not better after all prior to November or, actually, directly see more positive features in the former regime. Thus far, naturally, this segment is not presenting any kind of declarative formulation of the type that says "communism was better"—it is more a matter of a feeling that "we were better off before." But, for the future, we must count on the fact that this private dissatisfaction will acquire a more political coloration.

[Lamp] This means a great opportunity for various discoverers of third roads.

[Boguszak] Yes, it is absolutely clear that, for certain political groupings and forces, the current situation represents a unique opportunity to finally gain support. And they will most likely get it from a portion of the populace, given suitably selected social demagoguery.

[Lamp] What does this mean for the political representation which has economic reform in its program and wishes to continue with it?

[Boguszak] The majority of Czechoslovak society (66 percent in the Czech Republic, only 42 percent in the Slovak Republic) continues to be convinced that development is proceeding in the correct direction and is willing to accept the relatively drastic impacts of the reform. In comparison with Hungary, where only one-fifth of the population considers developments to be

proceeding correctly, this is not bad. In order for this support to last, people must be informed in detail and on a timely basis as to what we are embarked upon. Political and economic key figures should publicize their clear vision of reform steps, let us say, in a time frame of six months, a year, and two years, including information on the kind of negative impact in which the transformation will result. The concealing of unpleasant sides of things will lead to nowhere. They will occur anyway, even if people think that they were not in the plan, even if people are more upset and frightened by them than they need to be.

The Hungarian example is both a stimulus for us and a warning sign. It shows that the reform can be prosecuted even under conditions of considerable social apathy; on the other hand, we see how great the loss of support is if the reform process becomes a protracted and chronic disease without visible change for the better.

People Do Not Know What To Do

[Lamp] Citizens are receiving quantities of information regarding changes for the better, regarding political and civic freedoms, regarding new economic laws...

[Boguszak] Let us leave political relaxation aside—that is not where the problem lies. The fact that a large part of the population still does not see any changes in their immediate surroundings, particularly in the enterprises where they work, is another matter. Apart from a small layer of active people, the majority has the feeling that they are continuing to live in a socialist system and, to a certain extent, have feelings of the same kind of powerlessness in the face of this system as they did before. They simply do not know how to approach the system, how to change it on an individual basis. Or, let us say it in another way, people sense that an area is opening up here to allow for personal activity, that they have the opportunity to handle their lives freely, but they do not know how to do that. And they wait passively until someone from above tells them how. Examples showing what all can be done in this area would be tremendously helpful. Positive examples of normal human activity which were winners.

Similarly, the extent of fear would be greatly reduced if people knew, within their surroundings, how the social safety net functions. For the present, the citizen has the feeling that should he find himself in a difficult situation, he will visit the authorities, which are the same as ever and where no one will give him any information and no one will help him.

[Lamp] In the face of such problems, what is today's confidence in political representation?

[Boguszak] It is declining even though there is still a majority share in the Czech Lands (in the Czech Republic, some 46 percent believe the current government; in Slovakia, 27 percent). And in comparison with Hungary, we continue to be well-off—there, only about

20 percent of the population have any confidence in the decision-making political forces.

A full 90 percent of the population of Bohemia and Moravia (but only 51 percent of the population of the Slovak Republic) believe that the current political leaders are "honest and forthright" (in Poland, 50 percent; in Hungary, 32 percent). One-third of the citizens of the Czech Republic believes that the noncommunist government has, for the present, done "excellent work" or "good work"; in Slovakia, this same opinion is shared by 18 percent of the population.

However, a possible threat to democratic development is the fact that virtually 40 percent of our citizens (33 percent in the Czech Republic, 48 percent in the Slovak Republic) believe that in order for us to achieve economic prosperity we need "a stronger government." In Poland, 33 percent of the population have this view; in Hungary, even 68 percent of the people.

This notion of the need for a government with a firm hand clashes, to a certain extent, with another interesting fact: In all three countries, there exists only a very foggy notion as to what representative democracy actually is. The majority of people prefer some kind of direct street-type popular government, under which "I can do as I wish" and under which I have the right to participate directly in decisionmaking. Understanding of a representative form of government is, surprisingly, the strongest in Bohemia, but only in comparison with other investigated total components. In comparison with the West, we are all in the same boat: It is a different perception of a political system, a differently perceived participation by the citizen in political events.

Relationship With Minorities

[Lamp] What is the relationship between society and the minorities in the investigated countries?

[Boguszak] Generally speaking, the population of all three countries shows evidence of a sizable degree of intolerance, cultural foreclosure, and discriminating attitudes with respect to minorities. And this is not just a question of ethnic, racial minorities; people react with irritation to any kind of "otherness," differentness. It is clear that, in all postcommunist countries, there is an ongoing disintegration process which is manifested in deteriorating relationships between virtually all social groupings, irrespective of whether they are relationships between urban and rural areas, between employer and employee, between workers and the intelligentsia, etc.

The most visible is the aversion toward nationalities minorities. The Gypsies (Romanys) have come off the worst: On average, virtually 80 percent of the East European population (in Hungary, 76 percent; in Poland, 72 percent; in the CSFR, 85 percent) adopts a highly negative attitude toward them. Some 87 percent of the citizens of Czechoslovakia believe that the Romanis have only themselves to blame for this enmity on account of their conduct (in Hungary, 69 percent; in

Poland, 43 percent). The Arabs, followed by Negroes and Asiatics, ended up in second place as far as unpopularity is concerned.

Relationships with Jews are a special chapter. As far as direct contact with the Jewish population is concerned, the overall numbers are relatively favorable; they definitely do not indicate any kind of danger of pogroms or similar events (for example, only 6 percent of the Poles, 3 percent of the citizens of the CSFR, and 1 percent of the Hungarians do not agree with the view that Jews should have the right to freely practice their religion).

Far more menacing, however, is the notion that Jews are a certain political and economic force, views which are primarily prevalent in Poland and in Slovakia. Thirty-seven percent of the Slovak population "very much believe" or "completely believe" that Jews have an excessively great influence in politics (in the Czech Republic, 9 percent) and 42 percent of Slovaks are convinced that Jews have an excessive influence in economic life (in the Czech Republic, 12 percent). In contrast to Poland, where anti-Semitism has more cultural and historic roots, the Slovak notion regarding the omnipotent Jewish network is closely tied to additional political and economic attitudes. The investigation demonstrated that the majority of people who are governed by this notion are, at the same time, among the strongest rejectors of the post-November developments, consider the current political personalities as being "cunning" and "opportunistic," clearly prefer a socialist type of economy, and reject a pro-Western orientation. All of these characteristics are, at the same time, very closely tied to separatist tendencies, so that it seems that they involve not so much a specific attitude toward Jews, but are more involved with yet another variation of the adequately well-known experiment called national socialism. It is only unbelievable that in the nineties of the 20th century such seductions are alive anywhere and that such a large part of the population could fall prey to them.

Czechs and Slovaks

[Lamp] There has been mention several times of great differences between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Is this actually such a discernible shift in attitude and in perceiving the situation?

[Boguszak] Yes. In a number of cases, the difference between views in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic is greater than the difference between Czechs and Hungarians or between Hungarians and Poles. These are actually two quantitatively and qualitatively different entities.

[Lamp] So those who claim that it is impossible to preserve a common state are right?

[Boguszak] A whole lot will depend on developments involving the top political scene. As long as individual national "specifics" continue to be stressed—irrespective of whether they pertain to the Czech

Republic or to the Slovak Republic—and as long as the political and economic differences between the two countries will continue to be magnified, both republics will become incompatible over the short term and the state could disintegrate. A second possibility is to seek that which is common and to adhere to the basic rules of the game in so doing: to at least to a minimum extent have the same political and economic system. To the extent to which both republics will keep pace with regard to economic reform, this will mean that Slovakia will see an outburst of great social problems, to which political problems are tied. And this will be a transformation process which will be more complicated and more painful—we have to anticipate that. However, the Czech Republic should extend a helping hand to Slovakia in its difficulties. If the CSFR is to remain as a single entity, it is necessary to put an end to considerations regarding individual local advantages involved in partition or disadvantages of coexistence and to begin to provide maximum support for unifying tendencies.

(AISA—Association for Independent Social Analysis has been operating since January 1990 and completed its first extensive poll in May of that year.

Marek Boguszak, candidate of sciences (1952). Graduated from the Mathematics-Physics Faculty of Charles University, devotes himself to the application of mathematics in the area of social sciences. Director of the Association for Independent Social Analysis.)

[Box, p 8]

(Extract from the report issued by Freedom House)

More than two-thirds of the respondents have the impression that democracy in their country is having serious difficulties.

Virtually all (more than 85 percent) of the respondents stated that their personal material situation was worse or the same now as opposed to before the free elections.

The activities of all three governments in the investigated countries are being monitored critically. The majority of Polish and Hungarian respondents consider their representatives to be opportunists, whereas the Czechoslovak political elite continues to be viewed by its citizenry as being honest.

The majority of citizens in the entire region is, nevertheless, optimistic with regard to the future. More than 50 percent of the respondents believe that things will take a turn for the better within the next five years. This feeling is strongest in Czechoslovakia.

Respondents expressed their clear convictions—particularly in Poland and in Czechoslovakia—that democracy can function even in countries having great economic difficulties.

Attitudes toward the West appear to be generally positive, which is documented by the great popularity of

Western statesmen, primarily, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher. In contrast, evaluations of Mikhail Gorbachev were surprisingly negative.

The majority of the population of the region considers collaboration with the West to be of equal importance for the success of the economic reform as well as for further political development. Technical and commercial participation is valued by the respondents more than a mere increasing of financial assistance.

The poll showed that citizens of all three countries reject a return to communism and that, without regard to the current political and economic uncertainty, they are accepting the democratic system.

Virtually every one of the respondents participated in the elections, but only a negligible percentage belong to any kind of political party. A similarly negligible number participated in any kind of civic activities during the past year, with the exception of participation in revolutionary street demonstrations.

Federation Seen as Bulwark Against Clericalism

1U0407150391 Bratislava *PRAVDA* in Slovak
3 Jul 91 p 2

[CTK report in the "Briefly From Home" column]

[Text] "The threat of clericalism, which exists in Slovakia, is one of the strongest motives for preserving the federation," Boris Zala, chairman of Social Democracy in Slovakia, stressed at yesterday's news conference organized by Czechoslovak Social Democracy. To support his claim, he referred to the words of Archbishop Jan Sokol who publicly appealed to religious deputies in the Slovak National Council to vote for the return of church property, regardless of their party affiliation. He also mentioned a certain form of cadre screening being applied in competitive bids for jobs in the state administration when demands for a certain denomination are often voiced.

Fedor Gal on Understanding Slovak Aspirations

91CH06754 Prague *RESPEKT* in Czech 2 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by Benjamin Kuras: "The Federation Will Endure—F Gal in London"]

[Text] "We are facing two principal tasks, the solution of which will make the decision regarding our life over the next 20 years: constitutions which will guarantee the preservation of the federation to the satisfaction of both nations and the economic reform, without which our dream of democracy will collapse," said Fedor Gal last week in London, where he had come for a three-month rest from Slovak politics and the hatred of the Bratislava crowds. He will certainly also contemplate what to do next: remain abroad, return to sociology, live at home or, at least for some time, abroad.

As a result of his very existence, Fedor Gal is, so to speak, an "illegal" person. He was born in the ghetto of Terezin, where children were not supposed to be born, and the female prison inmates used to hide him in a box. He has also spent the last several months of his life in the CSFR virtually "in a box." In his Bratislava apartment, he had to install an armored door, he could leave the house only accompanied by two armed guards. He received thousands of vulgar hateful letters. People even called his mother; the telephone calls were full of obscenities and hate. He left with a heavy heart. He says that people in Slovakia are exhausted and ruined, several politicians have had heart attacks. One week in London was not quite enough for him to calm down, but he is not angry with, nor does he blame his persecutors.

"What happened had to happen. People's basic needs had been suppressed for 40 years, including the desire to spit at someone. They were not allowed to have a go at Bilak; now they can have a go at Gal. It is therapy for them. They suffer from a deep-seated sense of being a minority and they need to create an enemy," he says.

According to Gal, something is happening in Slovakia which the Czechs do not understand because they never had the problem of statehood. Slovakia was never a state—with the exception of the wartime state, which was a black stain on Slovak history. Although they have more power today than before, Slovaks as a nation are, as yet, searching for their own identity and self-awareness in order to be able to close the door on their nationality and to feel like free and reliable partners with equal rights. This does not mean, by a long shot yet, that all those who feel this way are separatists. According to the most recent public opinion investigations, approximately 75 percent of Slovaks favor the federation.

Gal notes that even Slovak federalists were surprised by the fundamental lack of understanding on the part of the Czechs in the negotiations regarding the federal constitution. The federation is just coming into being. Slovaks want to form it from below: the sovereign citizen will give up a part of his sovereignty to the republic, the sovereign republic will give up part of its sovereignty to the federation. Czech politicians are alleged to have understood the federation to be like a process of decentralization, from above. It is alleged that during the negotiations on the constitutions, Slovaks experienced many unpleasant disappointments.

According to Gal, Slovakia is currently the neuralgic point of Europe: The decision as to where the future borders of Europe will be will be made in Slovakia. The territory of Slovakia is covered by KGB transmitters, although they do not have much to broadcast for the time being, their training transmissions have been recorded. If Slovakia could be successfully destabilized or separated, this would have unfathomable consequences, both for Poland and also Hungary. That is why Hungary is also letting its minority in Slovakia know that it should not in any way participate in destabilization efforts and disrupt the unity of Czechoslovakia.

The fascist-type tendencies in Slovakia are, to a considerable extent, provoked by the still functioning agent net of the form of political police and by some exile groups. In the crowds which smashed the doors of the Slovak parliament, Pitner, minister of the interior of the Slovak Republic, recognized former StB [State Security Police] agents, and Professor Kusy recognized his one-time interrogator in the crowd of separatist demonstrators on 17 November 1990.

That which supports stupid Slovak nationalism, Fedor Gal says, has to do with the past: In the nation, there is a deep-seated lack of confidence in politicians and leading representatives of power, despite the fact that they are freely elected in democratic elections. People are afraid to take their lives into their own hands. They do not want to be responsible for themselves. This serves as an explanation for the popularity of Meciar. The former prime minister promised: I shall pull you out of this morass. He will not pull them out. They will have to get out by themselves.

Gal notes that people still do not understand these fundamental things: The main ills of the Slovak economy are not solvable with Slovak resources. There is no entrepreneurial class, nor will it exist for a number of years to come, which could solve them. In the international context, a Slovak state would be a negligible magnitude. The fulminating and uncertain situation repels Western entrepreneurs from making investments. The future integrated Europe does not need a destabilized or disintegrated Czechoslovakia. Slovakia could find itself behind the barbed wire and outside of Europe.

However, Gal closes by advising that you remain calm. Toward the end of this year, a federal constitution will be worked out. Czechoslovakia will be preserved as a single state and will strive to enter the new Europe. Anything else would be a catastrophe for all of us.

And on what does he base this optimism?

"Someone should finally notice that, although dramatic changes occurred in Slovakia quite rapidly—more rapidly than elsewhere—all of this overt intolerance did not lead to the spilling of a single drop of blood."

Support for Ruthenian Autonomy Movement

91CH06774 Prague LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE in Czech
19 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by "hor": "The Fate of the Statue and the Country"]

[Text] In Uzhhorod, on Masaryk Square, a statue of President T.G. Masaryk in bigger-than-life size was unveiled in the 1930's. It was the work of an outstanding local sculptor—Mondicova, a graduate of the Prague Academy. However, the Masaryk statue did not stand in its place for long. After the occupation of Carpatho-Ruthenia in March 1939, Horthy's soldiers first put a knapsack on the back of the statue so that they could

then dishonor it and crassly indicated that it should "leave" the country. Shortly thereafter, the occupation authorities tore down the statue themselves. There was long-time speculation—and we also wrote about it some time ago in LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE—that the statue had been successfully saved; however, it has now been proven that the Hungarians eliminated the statue.

Last fall, not far from the location of the Masaryk statue, Hungarian president Göncz and the highest Ukrainian representative, Kravchuk, met to unveil a statue of the Hungarian poet Petöfi. In the interim, Carpatho-Ruthenia illegally became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic following a takeover by Stalin in 1944 and 1945 and the Ruthenian people, who make up the majority of the population of this country, found themselves under a new occupying power. Today, as spokesmen for the Ruthenians say, and as was also confirmed at the recent First World Congress of Ruthenians at Medzilaborce, the Ruthenian identity is subjected to a new threat. They fear Ukrainian nationalism and the dangerous plans of extremists related to the idea of a Great Ukraine.

The Ruthenian Association in Uzhhorod dispatched two fundamental memoranda on the rights of the Ruthenian people to exist and the right to be free to the secretary general of the United Nations recently and to President Gorbachev of the USSR. For the present, the Carpatho-Ruthenians have received no response to either proclamation. However, they did not receive any responses to their letters addressed to the chairman of the Federal Assembly, A. Dubcek. Also, other localities, both in Prague and also in Bratislava, have, thus far, behaved with uncertainty. And this in the face of the fact that, during a recent official visit by delegates of the European Parliament in our republic, these European spokesmen themselves spoke of the subsequent fate of Carpatho-Russia in central Europe during their discussions. Even that country has a right to be free and cannot be permanently deprived of the right to an independent national existence, such as is supposed to be guaranteed, by the way, even by the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Those accords state that borders in Europe are not to be forcibly changed, but that all problems and disputes should be resolved by agreement and in a spirit of friendship. If this was true, say, for the recent changes in Germany, then it is all the easier to apply this principle even to Carpatho-Russia, which was part of the Czechoslovak Republic until 1945 and actually continues to be part of it to this day according to international law.

One of the steps, should truth return to this rich and beautiful country—which has, thus far, not been devastated—should be the erection of a new statue to President T.G. Masaryk in Uzhhorod. This year could present a historic occasion for this. It was 70 years ago that our first president visited Carpatho-Ruthenia and, on the occasion of his official journey, stipulated the principles for a free life and for development of Carpatho-Ruthenia.

Republican Party Chairman on His Private Life

91CH0665A Prague SVET V OBRAZECHE in Czech
No 22, 91 pp 6-8

[Interview with Dr. Miroslav Sladek, chairman of the Association for the Republic—The Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, by Oldrich Danihelka in Prague; date not given: "Who are you, Dr. Sladek?"—first two paragraphs and last paragraph are SVET V OBRAZECHE introduction and conclusion]

[Text] I hung up five times. Always before the monotonous voice had a chance to tell me that I had 30 seconds to leave my message. The sixth time I could not bear it any more and started to leave a message. Suddenly a voice asked: "Is that you?" Yes it is. SVET V OBRAZECHE... "I normally refuse to talk to reporters on principle, but in this case I'll keep my promise. When are you coming?" "Okay, tomorrow at eight-thirty. But I don't know how the photos will turn out, I don't look very good in the morning. Because I always come home from meetings during the night. Last night I got back from Znojmo at 0200 hours."

We do not care about the photos. We want to find out about Dr. Miroslav Sladek, the 40-year-old chairman of the Association for the Republic—The Republican Party of Czechoslovakia. At 0830 in the morning we entered one of the apartment houses in Dejvice, Prague 6. We found out from a notice on the door that the secretariat had moved to Strojnicka 3, Prague 7. Nevertheless, the entrance hall is still being used both as an office and as a study. Papers are strewn all over the place, there is a computer and that damned telephone answering machine. Although Dr. Sladek meets us in his shirt sleeves he is wearing a tie. Even after the marathon of night meetings he looks as he always does—good.

[Danihelka] Do you have a normal track suit hidden in your closet?

[Sladek] I admit that when I was young I... wore jeans, long hair, and a camouflage jacket. As long as a person is a private citizen, it does not matter what he wears. But once he has become public property to some extent, he must behave and dress accordingly. For example, I do not particularly like the way the Federal Minister of the Interior wears his hair. A suit and a tie—that's my style, and it should be a matter of course for all politicians.

[Danihelka] I cannot imagine you, of all people, ever going "hiking," for instance....

[Sladek] I loved it. I crossed the whole Republic that way. A tent, a blanket, and a spoon were all I needed ... I loved it. And at the same time, I realized just how magnificent our country really is. In the morning dew, when the shafts of the sun's rays penetrate the green vault of the trees, our country truly looks like a cathedral. This is my country, I am proud of it, and I hope that with joint forces we will succeed in putting it in order.

[Danihelka] Are you religious?

[Sladek] Roman Catholic. I used to go to Mass regularly, and I never missed going to St. Vit's Cathedral when Cardinal Tomasek was celebrating Mass. In those days there weren't that many of us, and afterward we all used to accompany the Cardinal to the Archbishop's Palace and he would wave to us from the balcony. I also never failed to wave toward the cameras, which were carefully watching us from the Castle. Recently, when we went to the Castle with the Republicans, the cameras were there again. So I waved again. In fact, I want to ask them to make copies of some of the good shots so we can use them in the preelection campaign.

But I get to church less frequently now. Apart from that, it has now become the fashionable thing to do, and I don't like crowds. So I regularly stop off at St. Tadeas's and light three candles so he will intercede for me and hold his protective hand over me.

[Danihelka] Were your parents religious, too?

[Sladek] I lived in Kostelec nad Orlici until I graduated from university, and my mother came from Caslava, from Polabi. Religion was a matter of course in farming families. Although my grandmother almost committed heresy at one point when, under socialism, she declared that she would probably not have anything to do with the church any more, because if a God existed, he would not permit such

[Danihelka] You just omitted a word there—does Dr. Sladek sometimes use dirty language?

[Sladek] On principle I only use words that can be found in the Dictionary of Literary Czech.

[Danihelka] It seems that your entire life is based on principles?

[Sladek] That's right. I don't drink alcohol, I don't smoke, I don't even drink black coffee.

[Danihelka] Is that an affectation or a habit?

[Sladek] A habit. If one is constantly surrounded by people, one can't afford to slip. My favorite drink is tea.

[Danihelka] What about a vegetarian diet?

[Sladek] No. I can't imagine not eating meat. Though I also have a weakness for sweet things. Once when I was the leader at a Pioneer camp, I broke a record. In a competition I ate 60 plum dumplings at one sitting.

[Danihelka] You used to go to Pioneer camps?

[Sladek] Yes, I enjoyed them. The ROH [Revolutionary Trade-Union Movement] ones. You see, I love children. I always spent half the year on preparations and, since I was not permitted time off from work, I took three weeks' vacation to go to them. Now reporters are criticizing me for it.

[Danihelka] What about your family? Do they understand your present work?

[Sladek] My daughter is in her first year at university and my wife teaches German at the university. They know I give it all I've got. But it is a task that suits me. I am in my element. And my daughter and wife help me

The lady of the house was at home, offered us some coffee and, by the way, commented "Mirek always had to keep busy doing something. He was never the type to sit around drinking coffee and gossiping away the working hours with women."

[Sladek] I always caught up with all my work on Monday morning and then I was free to spend the week reading and learning languages. For example, that's how I learned French. Eight hours a day for three months. Merely so I could read the original version of the Three Musketeers, and also Robert Merle, whom I like very much. I knew that I was condemned to being a skilled official; that for several decades I would go to work every morning and return home in the evening, then I would turn grey, would drop out, and goodbye I simply told them clearly that I did not want to join the communists. So I studied. I can read and speak English, German, Spanish, French, and such languages as Polish and Russian, but those are just minor details. I would probably go crazy if I just had to sit and stare at a wall.

I received my Ph.D. degree for a thesis on the integration of automated control systems and automated information systems. Apart from that, I studied scientific and technological information and library science. Although things were rather uncertain in respect to philosophy under socialism, I did, at least, get a clear view. A book is still the best source of information.

[Danichelka] Even here, in the entrance hall-study you have a collection of books. What books do you like best?

[Sladek] I read the Bible, de Saint-Exupery, and Frantisek Gellner. But what I most like to read are books on art. The History of Art by Pijoan. And my relationship to art is not merely passive. I painted the pictures on the walls. But its like applied art, to complete the interior decoration. Its my hobby, for which I naturally don't have time any more. However, when I was expelled from the Research Institute of Social Development and Labor, I was unemployed for three-quarters of a year, and totally without money. There were no unemployment benefits, and I wasn't even a professional dissident, so no one paid me in German marks or in dollars. So, apart from being an extra at Barandov, I earned a little money by selling a few paintings. But that was an emergency.

[Danichelka] Your first job was as a research worker?

[Sladek] Not my first, nor my last. I parted company with employers rather quickly because I refused to submit to senseless instructions, and I said so openly. That was never popular, and is not popular today, either. In addition, I always held to the principle that a fish stinks from its head, and so I attacked issues and problems from the top. And I still do. Also, I always wanted to get to the essence of the problem. Because a

wrong decision by the leadership, irrespective of whether it is an enterprise or the state, can obstruct the efforts of the people below. And, however hard they try, the little people can't do anything about it.

Our conversation was interrupted by the mailman, delivering the daily quota of correspondence—about 40 letters. Applications for membership in the Republican Party, letters of thanks, and, about once a month, an anonymous letter. In the meantime, Mrs. Sladkova showed us some more of her husband's paintings ... "he also built the fireplace himself, installed the heating, and panelled the walls."

[Danichelka] Does your husband have time to answer all the letters?

[Sladkova] He sticks to the principle that he should personally answer all letters sent to his address.

But when? At this point, Mr. Sladek returned.

[Sladek] I get up very early and immediately start answering the correspondence. I finish it later in the car, after lunch, while we are driving to meetings. We use a rented Favorit, seven days a week. And since I'm no Edison, I suffer badly from lack of sleep. Three hours simply are not enough, but I could not keep up otherwise.

[Danichelka] Did it ever occur to you that you would end up in politics?

[Sladek] I always knew. For example, when I was young, I founded the Party of Optimistic Realists. At that time one used to say that the country was divided into pessimists, realists, and optimists. The pessimist learned Russian, the optimist learned English, and the realist learned how to shoot. But at that time I only had five members.

[Danichelka] Nevertheless, I would not have expected the intensity with which you throw yourself into things ...

[Sladek] Under socialism that was my camouflage. They kept on stepping on me, so I used to pretend. I also did it to get a job. They simply could not, and still cannot bear it if some one stands out or is better.

[Danichelka] Doesn't political advancement change a person?

[Sladek] That's quite normal in Czechoslovakia. Many people were put in high positions, they got rich, and, due to their inadequate intelligence or deficient morality, they could not deal with it. Most of the people in power now are in that position. I spent the greater part of my life in poorer circumstances. I was never a famous person, and did not even come from a famous family. My father worked for the CSD [Czechoslovak National Railroads] and then worked as a paver, my mother was a clerk, and I went to the work brigades so I could study. I believe I am rooted firmly in this land, and therefore I

am unlikely to elevate myself above other as the present potentates do. There is too little public control.

[Danhelka] Aren't you a little afraid after your speeches? Before we arrived we heard that you have even brought an action against the president?

[Sládek] We have a little hamster to guard us at home, apart from that we have no protection. But seriously—we've had some signs. For example, the secret police rang our doorbell at 0430 in the morning. It was a play on nerves. Recently our secretariat was robbed. But I'm not really worried. Firstly—politics in Czechoslovakia are not dangerous, like they are in some other places; and secondly—a potential assassination attempt would merely help our—in other words the Republican party.

This was an interview with Dr. Miroslav Sládek, a person whom some find to be a soul-mate and others detest. We did not discuss his political opinions on purpose. He does not keep them secret and they can be heard everywhere.

Skoda Plant Becomes 10 Independent Enterprises

[U 030712J691 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 2 Jul 91 p 2]

[Article by "(dan)": "Skoda Definitively Divided"]

[Text] The Skoda Mlada Boleslav automobile plant—from which the Skoda automobile shareholding company was separated in April and turned into a joint enterprise with Volkswagen—was definitively liquidated on 1 July and divided into 10 independent state enterprises. This decision was made by Czech Industry Minister Jan Vrba. The liquidation of the former Skoda plant and its division into the RABS Liberec, Autometal Příbram, AZ Běla pod Bezdězem, APO Praha Závahlice, Autocentrum Praha Hostivice, Autocentrum Libouchec, Autospektrum Mariánské Lázně, Autocentrum Brno, AZ Býty Mlada Boleslav, and Skoda Mlada Boleslav enterprises means that a further step has been taken toward its privatization.

SZDSZ President Kis on 'Political Stalemate'

*91CH0671A Budapest VILAG in Hungarian 5 Jun 91
pp 8-10*

[Interview with Janos Kis, Alliance of Free Democrats chairman, by Bela Kerekes; place and date not given: "Bela Kerekes' Interview With Janos Kis"—first two paragraphs are VILAG introduction]

[Text] One who wants to invite some noted political figure for a longer conversation must have patience. The situation was of course the same in the past, perhaps with the following small difference: Impatience did not even make sense in those days because the journalist to be honored had little hope of obtaining real answers to his questions.

In all probability SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] Chairman Janos Kis has no more time at hand than our great figures of the past, but Kis has answers to provide. And this is a rare treasure even nowadays.

[Kerekes] How does philosopher Janos Kis feel in his political role?

[Kis] A system has collapsed, and a better one is coming into being at the cost of terrible difficulties. It is important to take part in this renaissance, this is a life experience which reinforces one's individuality. This, of course, does not change the fact that I regard philosophy as my profession, and for this reason I am unable to feel entirely well in the political mill, but I don't mind.

[Kerekes] I assume this is not based on your age, but many regard you as the party's doyen who is the number one leader, not because everyone is listening to him, but because they are listening to him because he is Janos Kis. To what extent do you feel at home as chairman?

[Kis] A peculiar situation exists in a large political organization when a person accumulates a kind of authority and moral capital which provides an opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to settle disputes. In any event, I would not want to abuse this confidence and terminate disputes purely on the basis of authority. I endeavor to mediate, to integrate viewpoints.

[Kerekes] Was your decision to accept the chairmanship based merely on constraints, or did you feel able to perform that function?

[Kis] There are no absolute standards for judging ability. The fact that a real professional politician stratum has not yet evolved in Hungary is known. Considering this fact, I might not have been the worst choice from among those within the SZDSZ who could have been considered at the outset. On the other hand, I have the good sense to recognize the limits of my political abilities.

[Kerekes] Should this be understood as a statement that you do not regard yourself as a real politician?

[Kis] That's right. But presently, and I do not intend to qualify anyone with this statement, I feel that I have a place and things to do in politics.

[Kerekes] As chairman of the strongest opposition party do you feel enough strength to become prime minister in the event that your party becomes the ruling party?

[Kis] No, I don't. I have already established for myself the limits of my public role when National Assembly elections were announced. I do not intend to play a political role which involves the exercise of public authority.

[Kerekes] Not even in a constrained situation in which, let's say, to permit that white smoke to rise?

[Kis] Had the SZDSZ become part of the cabinet after the elections I probably would not have avoided accepting a cabinet post. However, by now I do not think that there would be a need for that.

[Kerekes] There has been talk about a coalition. Under a possible transfer of power scenario, who would be the SZDSZ's compulsory as well as natural allies?

[Kis] As we declared in February, changing the government by parliamentary means would be desirable from the standpoint of the country's stability. At the same time we also declared our preparedness to take part in resolving the situation. We would do so either as participants in a new coalition, or as supporters of an acceptable cabinet. Today, it is most worthwhile to think about ways in which the political stalemate which has evolved could be resolved. Having a broad coalition would be one possibility. This would be less than what is usually referred to as a national unity government, but it would be more than a grand coalition. In a broad coalition like the one I'm talking about, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democratic People's Party would be on one side, while the liberal parties, the SZDSZ and the Association of Young Democrats, would be on the other. The other alternative, which I regard as worthy of consideration, would be one in which the present coalition—following the departure of the Smallholders—would continue to govern in the minority. This would of course presume certain agreements with the opposition regarding legislative issues and governance. Negotiations between the parties could possibly make sense if a minority government would be established. I do not necessarily have in mind negotiations between the six parties, but rather a dialogue between the cabinet and the opposition which would involve the real stakes under such conditions. At present, the head of the cabinet is not inclined to reach binding agreements with the opposition due to the numerical majority that he has. He much rather endeavors to sustain the coalition at any price. The property compensation law adventure demonstrates where this leads.

[Kerekes] Would you say that under those circumstances you would provide greater support to the cabinet than you do now?

[Kis] Presently, we are unable to support the cabinet at all because the cabinet does not seek our support, among other reasons. Only in exceptional situations could the opposition support a coalition of which it is not part. It could do so for two reasons: an interest in maintaining the possibility to govern, or for the obvious fact that it would be easier to reach agreements with a government in the minority—agreements to be observed by both sides.

[Kerekes] The question is of course at what time the cabinet, or whether the cabinet will at all, regard the situation as one in which your support is worth more than its own, existing position.

[Kis] As long as the prime minister feels that he is able to hold the coalition together, and thus control the majority of votes in the parliament, he obviously can disregard the will of the opposition at his pleasure. But the head of the cabinet assumes an extremely large responsibility by adhering to his coalition partners to the extent this is done today. This is because he is repeatedly forced to accept decisions he did not espouse earlier. It is not certain that the practice of sustaining the coalition just for the sake of having that coalition can be continued for long. This practice is definitely fatal from the country's standpoint.

[Kerekes] What could the SZDSZ suggest to the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] which would make it worthwhile for the MDF to break up the coalition under the circumstances of possible minority governance?

[Kis] The most important function the cabinet should deal with is to stabilize the economy, and within that, to accelerate privatization. To accomplish this the cabinet would need much broader support than it has today.

[Kerekes] If I understand you correctly, you are offering [the support of] your mass political constituency.

[Kis] Yes. One must recognize that resistance to the unavoidable victimizing of people manifests itself not only on part of the public, but is also manifested by some very strong lobbies which are at work. Essentially, these lobbies are interested in seeing no change. Firm government policies against these lobbies also require broader societal support than what presently exists. In other words, we are able to offer a more favorable political situation in which the apparently unavoidable economic package plan may be implemented.

[Kerekes] I am aware of the fact that people hold various views about the role of the opposition, and within that, about the role to be played by the SZDSZ. However, a view which holds that the SZDSZ is losing more and more of its initial momentum is gaining strength. While the SZDSZ was an excellent boxing partner, it has more than once lost out in wrestling, quite often in the course of wrestling in the mud.

[Kis] A political stalemate evolved after the taxi blockade, and it is difficult to resolve this situation. The

essence of it is that the coalition suffered an unusually great loss of popularity, one could say that it virtually lacked societal support. At the same time, despite tense disputes which divide the faction, it continues to control the parliamentary majority in an unchanged manner. Oddly enough, in the present situation, the extraordinary lack of popularity of the government does not favor the opposition party either. I could also say that this situation is even less favorable than a situation in which the cabinet would be successful in its political pursuits. If the cabinet was more successful we would not be expected to make the cabinet fail by any means.

[Kerekes] Why? Is this what people expect you to do?

[Kis] Yes. They expect us to create a situation in which the cabinet either resigns, or is forced to recognize that it does not govern according to its own will.

[Kerekes] How do you know that the public expects this? Who expects this, and how many people expect this to happen?

[Kis] This requirement is constantly expressed in the vicinity of the SZDSZ. And beyond that, all public opinion research results unequivocally prove that the popularity of the ruling parties has plummeted by dramatic proportions, they have lost the majority of their voter constituency.

[Kerekes] However, the same data do not show that with that expectation, or precisely for this reason, if you will, the popularity of the SZDSZ rises. Even though an opposition could not be in a more "comfortable" position than when public confidence in those who hold power appeared to be shaking.

[Kis] Our popularity index has not changed in the past indeed. At the same time, the composition of our potential voter base has undergone change, moreover in a favorable direction. While at the time of the elections the MDF was a real centrist party insofar as the distribution of its voter base was concerned, by now this voter base has been shifting toward the peripheries, while ours has been moving in the direction of the center. Returning to your question, persons disillusioned with the MDF establish immediate, overheated expectations vis-a-vis the SZDSZ, but we are unable to respond to this expectation as long as the political stalemate exists. This is why we are unable to make use of the advantages flowing from the reduced voter support of the ruling parties.

[Kerekes] Accordingly, are you saying that the public would expect the SZDSZ to adopt an even more radical stance?

[Kis] Yes. They do not regard as acceptable that the largest opposition party uses merely some harsh words regarding the government. They expect the largest opposition party to make the cabinet fail, and the public is disappointed if it is incapable of accomplishing that, and there is no opposition party today which could accomplish that.

[Kerekes] Previously we have talked about potential allies. In those days the SZDSZ most strongly attacked the concept of having a "strong" president of the republic. At this time a strong president of the republic could bolster the situation of the SZDSZ.

[Kis] I regard any political consideration which links the choice of the constitutional system to prevailing opportunities as dangerous. In other words, perceptions according to which the position of the president of the republic should be strong if he happened to be a free democrat, otherwise it should be weak. Recent experiences serve to reinforce our earlier position. We need a constitutional system which does not enable the concentration of power in the hands of the president of the republic, because such power could destroy democracy under circumstances when parliamentary institutions have not yet firmed up.

[Kerekes] This is true, but still, the fact that Arpad Goncz is closest to the SZDSZ spirit is no disadvantage to you, despite Goncz' undisputed human and political decency, and it will to act in a nonpartisan manner.

[Kis] No one could expect the president of the republic to change political convictions the moment he was elected. He is a member of the SZDSZ even today, the Constitution does not rule out this possibility. The fact that the president stands above the parties does not mean that he must not represent the spirit represented by his party, the SZDSZ, it only means that he cannot serve the partisan interests of the SZDSZ and that in political disputes he cannot express positions that favor the SZDSZ.

[Kerekes] More than a year has passed since the cabinet was formed. How does Janos Kis view the policies of the Antal cabinet, and in light of that, the oft mentioned pact?

[Kis] Even today, I regard the agreement as unavoidable and useful. We can accept that agreement with our heads raised and with pride. Having witnessed the often unfavorable prolongation of parliamentary battles it is not good to even think about the extent to which the new democracy would have been incapable of functioning had we not reached this agreement. Only a single expectation of ours has not been fulfilled. Our goal was not only to ensure the possibility of governing the country, we also hoped that as a result of the agreement the prime minister would be in a position to push to the side the extremist, populist elements in his own party and in the coalition. During the year that has since passed the opposite took place: The cabinet drifted along with the

extremists within the coalition. For the sake of fairness I must add, however, that the cabinet has not exceeded the limits established by the Constitution! It is trying to realize its unquenchable nostalgia for the past within these limits and endeavors to establish centralized state power based on authoritarian principles.

[Kerekes] You are an extremely levelheaded person, you consider and reconsider every word five times before saying it. To what extent did the past year change Janos Kis?

[Kis] I might be able to answer this question five years from now. Not only for you, but also for myself.

Popularity Poll of Hungarian Politicians Published

*LD0407164791 Budapest MTI in English 0907 GMT
4 Jul 91*

[Text] Budapest, 4 July (MTI)—Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic, continues to top the popularity list of 24 Hungarian politicians drawn up every month by the Hungarian-French media, opinion and market research institute Szonda-Ipsos. The results of the early June survey are carried in the 4 July issue of NEPSZABADSAG.

Second on the list comes Janos Palotas of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, president of the National Federation of Entrepreneurs, followed by former head of government Miklos Nemeth, Gyula Horn, president of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Gabor Fodor of the Federation of Young Democrats, and Viktor Orban, head of the parliamentary faction of the Federation of Young Democrats.

As compared to the May survey, the popularity of Jozsef Torgyan, newly-appointed president of the Independent Smallholders' Party, declined by 6 percent to 32 percent, while Gabor Fodor of the Federation of Young Democrats gained a further 4 percent in popularity (70 percent).

The popularity index of Arpad Goncz rose by 2 percent to 82 percent, and that of Tamas Deutsch of the Federation of Young Democrats by the same ratio to 66 percent. Istvan Csurka of the Hungarian Democratic Forum lost 2 percent of his popularity (45 percent).

Since January 1991, Arpad Goncz has gained 10 percent and Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa 7 percent in popularity, while Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and Mayor of Budapest Gabor Demszky recorded losses of 9 and 8 percent, respectively.

Council of Minorities To Coordinate Activities

*LD0307073991 Warsaw PAP in English 1759 GMT
2 Jul 91*

[Text] Warsaw, July 2—A Council of Minorities in the Republic of Poland was set up here on Tuesday [July 1] to coordinate the activities of the organizations of national and ethnic-religious minorities. The council's chairman is Mikolaj Aleksiejuk.

The new body is composed of representatives of social, political and religious associations of Belorussians, Germans, Jews, Karaites, and Lemkos living in Poland.

The Lithuanian organizations are also ready to join the council, and representatives of ethnic Slovaks and Czechs showed interest in the activities of the new body, but Ukrainian and Gypsy associations decided to stay aside.

Democratic Union's Rokita on Political System

*LU0507073791 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
1 Jul 91 p 3*

[Article by Jan Rokita, Democratic Union Parliamentary Club deputy and member of the Democratic Union's governing bodies: "A Parliamentary System Is the Only Solution"]

[Text] The beginning of Lech Walesa's presidency marked the beginning of a period of molding the political system.

The parliamentary and cabinet government system can be retained. Within the framework of this system, the president should be guaranteed powers enabling him to intervene when the normal mechanism of government becomes blocked. This would apply to political crises, to situations in which parliament is unable to form a government or pass a budget. That is precisely the option of which I am in favor.

There is also another vision of the political system. Its advocates believe that the role of parliament and the government should be kept to a minimum. Responsibility for day-to-day government would rest with the president and his officials.

Finally, there is also a third model. The elements of this model are to be found in, for example, the public statements made by representatives of the Christian-National Union. At a recent rally, one of them said that if it was up to him, he would restrict the role of the next Sejm to passing the constitution. After that, the members of parliament could return home, because why should they have to sit about on their benches for four years? This amounts to a declaration of the intent to eliminate representative bodies and to advocating not a presidential system, but dictatorship.

One sometimes hears the argument that Poles are not yet mature enough for democracy. I do not quite know what

that statement is meant to mean. It is an argument that tends to be in bad faith. I do not know why as profoundly an anarchic society as the Italian one should be more suited to democracy than Polish society?

A view that one encounters is that it is not possible to introduce a market economy into the country without the use of force. It seems that views of a similar kind are being shared by an increasing number of people. This may be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the kind of view that is not only an assessment of reality, but also shapes that reality. It shapes reality in a manner that is resolutely negative toward the state.

I am convinced that the chances for constructing a liberal economy in our country are linked exclusively to the stabilization of democratic institutions. That is the order in which things must occur. Stable democratic institutions have to be fostered first, and only once that has succeeded, can one think about constructing a market economy. Any other course would be a mistake.

Imposing a dictatorship does not seem to be possible to me. However, on the other hand, the introduction of a system of strong presidential rule does seem to be real possibility. Parliament would exist, but its role and that of the government would be greatly reduced. However, I maintain that in light of Lech Walesa's personality, the manner in which he governs, the evident inclination of the president and his chancellery to intervene in all the affairs of the state, the present chancellery team, the current economic situation and the mood among the public, presidential government would be dangerous for Poland. It would cause there to be more anarchy in public life. If only one person along with a group of his officials wants to regulate everything in the state, interfere in every conflict, then the degree of chaos must increase. Introducing order in a country that has been so destabilized as Poland can only be accomplished by organic means. People, institutions, and society must be allowed to become active. A legal framework has to be created that will ensure that the influence of public opinion is effective. The state's role cannot be made an absolute one, especially not that of a state represented by a single office. That is a concept that is doomed to end in a fiasco.

Commentary Spurns Kaczynski Proposal on Presidency

*LU0307134891 Warsaw GAZETTA WYBORCZA
in Polish 1 Jul 91 p 3*

[Untitled commentary by Ernest Skalski]

[Text] The decisionmaking center that Kaczynski has proposed existed in Poland until not all that long ago. It was called the Politburo of the Polish United Workers Party. It too was not mentioned in the Constitution; it too ran everything directly and the military and the police in particular, because those were its most important sources of support, and it too decided what constituted "an obvious evil."

All forms of "democratic dogmatism" were profoundly alien to it. Democracy was either bourgeois or socialist—of the right kind or the wrong kind. We do not know why Jaroslaw Kaczynski is trying to hawk a return to these methods of government as "rupturing the continuity between the Republic of Poland and the Polish People's Republic."

The point of departure is said to be "the disintegration of Polish statehood." It is true that the state is not functioning in the best possible way, but its condition is far removed from that of the disintegration being proposed by the senator and the head of the Presidential Chancellery of that very state.

Debate on Church Role in New Political Framework

91EP05424 Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
31 May 91 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Nosowski: "Church at a Turn"]

[Text] The Catholic Church's situation in the new Polish pluralism is a bit reminiscent of an elephant's dilemma in a china shop: Previously, the elephant had been in a zoological garden, and he felt strong. He knew what to do: He tore down the zoo gate and led everyone to freedom. Now, this new freedom is diametrically opposite to his previous situation. The elephant knows that now his task is to stay in the china shop and help put it in order. However, now it is necessary to behave differently, not to touch the china, not to step on it or break it. How does he do it?

The elephant can see that there is no vision to the order being set. The shelves are arranged chaotically. A rebuilding of a destroyed part of the shop is done without laying a foundation. Cheap pieces are put in the window, while true art is hidden in corners. The elephant wonders whether all this will withstand the times and feels responsible for the future of the shop. His opinion always counted before. He also has his own view of the way things should be in the shop, and he tries to set everything his way. He runs around, he tries to move among the shelves, and, although full of good will, he is clumsy, moves slowly, reacts with delay. Sometimes, willy nilly, he knocks a shelf with precious cups, and sometimes he is simply too big to fit in between shelves, and again some plates are lost. Hell is raised.

The elephant, poor thing, is trying to belittle the whole incident, instead of just saying, "sorry." Like anyone else, he does not like to be told off and finds it difficult, as anyone of high rank, to admit his mistakes, however small they may be.

There are those who throw all kinds of china in front of him to argue later that a china shop is not for him and he better go back to the zoo. They shout that his further presence would mean elephantizing the life of the shop, while the elephant should not have a more important position than the ant; after all, they have an equal sense

of honor. Others would have him lose weight, so that he could safely move between the shelves and stop bothering everyone. He could even live there as long as nobody noticed and remembered him only at holidays.

On the other hand, there are also those who try to convince him of his infallibility. Some of the shelves themselves do not feel too steady and try to use him as support. They literally fall on him, they lean and make the corridor narrower so that he has to stop in front of them. The elephant rather likes this because it is so nice to be needed. At the same time he does not give support to only one shelf, because he feels he may be needed by others. And those cups that instead of a handle have a trunk simply get on his nerves. Again, it is not appropriate to ignore them; after all, they all do it in good faith. The elephant knows subconsciously that his job should be of a completely different quality than giving support to the shelves in one corner only. The poor thing, however, still does not know how to define his proper job.

What Do Sociologists See?

A good indication of the dilemmas the church is facing are polls, which show a decline in trust of the church as an institution and a growing conviction that the church's influence on public life is too great. During the 1980's (there had been no such research earlier) the church was leading in the polis, which were trying to determine the degree of public trust in various institutions. In spring of 1991, in this type of ranking of public acceptance, the church dropped to second place after the army (the CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] poll showed this as early as March, and the OBOP [Center for Research on Public Opinion] poll showed this in April). The net acceptance indicator (this is the difference between positive and negative results) dropped from 83 percent in November 1989 to 28 percent in March 1991, according to CBOS. In February 1991, 67 percent of CBOS respondents answering the question "who has too much power in Poland?" indicated "the church." Similar results were received in a Demoskop poll in May: 60 percent of citizens believed the church has too much influence right now on decisions relating to areas other than faith and religion.

The above results seem to be alarming for the church, but it is necessary to see them in a wider perspective. First of all, we are dealing with a "ceiling effect": data regarding religion and church authority reached their maximum level, exceeding all normal standards. It is difficult to imagine any institution of public life enjoying a continuous general trust of more than 80 percent. The lowering of the level of public trust is partly a result of political changes and returning to normalcy.

The Church Does Not Have To Be Society's Advocate

The church's integrating and protective function is being taken over by other official institutions. The church has lost its monopoly on being "good." Considered the only

institution on the good side until 1989, the church had accumulated all of the social approbation. It had also taken under its wings various independent activities. Today this approbation must be simply distributed among many different institutions.

The decline in the church's authority goes along with the general diminishing of trust in all the institutions of public life. None of them avoided a drop in approval. The drop in trust of the church is the most spectacular because it was excessively high at the beginning. It is worth noting, however, that the parliament, the senate, and Solidarity all have a negative net acceptance indicator (that is, the number of their opponents is higher than supporters). This general plunge of optimism is seen most clearly in the fact that 80 percent of OBOP respondents consider the present social climate as negative.

One of the elements of the above process is a drop in positive attitudes toward Cardinal Jozef Glemp, according to OBOP findings, although he is still at the top of the popularity scale when compared to other political personalities. In May 1991, 65 percent declared their approval of him, which is 20 percent higher than approval of anybody else, and several points higher than that of the church. It is also significant that antipathy toward the primate was declared by only eight percent of those asked, which additionally strengthens his position on the net approval scale (57 percent, others no more than 30 percent). Therefore, he is and will surely remain a personality enjoying the highest public authority among Poles.

There is more food for thought in data on public opinion regarding too much church influence on politics. The data do not allow far-reaching conclusions because these are, after all, only poll results. This particular method of opinion sampling provides only superficial information. It does not give insight into deeper layers of public awareness and motivation that are decisive in matters of faith and religion. However, information that 67 percent of those interviewed believe that "the church has too much power in Poland" is extremely important, even if we take into account the method (the question was limited, and pointing to the church may indicate a general tendency for anticlericalism rather than deep convictions of the respondents). Nothing is known (from Demoskop polls) of what type of church influence, other than in matters of faith and religion, is considered appropriate, and nothing is known either of what is considered a matter of faith and religion. The cited results mean, however, that there is a process of change in attitudes toward the Catholic Church. The time of uncritical acceptance of its actions is gone. This process does not include, according to the above sources, the Polish primate who personifies church authority. It may mean that the animosity toward the church is evoked by the behavior of parish priests rather than bishops.

It may also mean that this animosity is a superficial reaction, an adopted stereotype, rather than a state of

mind. Otherwise, the animosity toward church actions would have been transferred onto its leader.

The process of changing attitudes toward the church can be seen even better in the dynamism of particular answers to the CBOS question "Do you believe that church actions serve the society well and are in keeping with the interests of the people?" For the last half year, answer curves of "usually yes," "difficult to say," and "definitely not" have been rather stable, with a dropping curve of "definitely yes" and a rising curve of "usually not." This signifies a steadily rising number of negative attitudes toward the church (answers "definitely not"), a diminishing number of uncritical supporters (answers "definitely yes") and a growing number of those critical of the church ("usually not"). In general, the attitude of uncertainty dominates ("usually..."), with a growing strength of negative voices within this group.

The process is very important because it is taking place among religious people who declare themselves as members of the church. Differences between bishops and their communities are most apparent in the high percentage of people demanding a referendum on the bill for legal protection of the life of an unborn child. In spite of a determined and loud protest of the Episcopate, two-thirds of those questioned (according to Demoskop) or three-quarters (according to CBOS) chose the referendum. Only 20 (Demoskop) or 15 (CBOS) percent were against the referendum, in keeping with the bishops' position. This last result should be seen in the context of the Poles' predominant tendency to participate directly in decisions on essential social issues through a referendum, taking into account, at the same time, people's high frustration level because of "not having enough power." In this context, the revolt against the bishops loses its significance slightly, while a poll cannot be a referendum substitute.

Undoubtedly, however, it was the abortion controversy that caused a rise in critical attitudes toward the church. Nothing else could be expected though, because in this matter social behavior is dramatically different from the church's moral teaching. The reintroduction of religion in schools, after all, did not become a dividing factor. CBOS polls show that as the introduction of religion classes in schools increased, the number of its opponents diminished: in May 1990, 60 percent were for and 28 percent were against; in September, 62 percent were for, 30 percent were against; in November, 70 percent were for, 27 percent were against; in March 1991, 74 percent were for, 22 percent were against. We can, therefore, conclude that the protest was against the method of decisionmaking and not the issue at hand.

An additional factor that helped silence emotions about catechetical instruction was stopping public discussion of this matter in the media. Proponents of the MEN [Ministry of National Education] recommendation occupied themselves with implementation, while opponents

could not find (with the exception of some purely incidental occurrences) any cases of intolerance, which they were so afraid of.

The last statement leads to one more conclusion. Mass media have become the "fourth power," a power to be reckoned with. They can bring down a state official deemed too clerical (public attorney Eksner, minister Kapera); they can raise emotions and they can calm them down. Undoubtedly, an influence on the rising animosity toward the church are messages sent by opinion-forming groups. We cannot deny the existence of some press organizations (as well as single journalists) who are negative in their attitude toward the church in general and to its influence on political life in particular. It happens that these particular papers are generally read and, in a way that is difficult to capture statistically, yet undoubtedly forceful, shape public opinion.

We can see this shaping if we look at the parallelism between "church" topics presented critically in the press and the reaction of public opinion. To give an example, when threats of "clericalization" were repeatedly voiced in mass media, soon this was reflected in opinions that the church has too much power. (It is a pity that sociologists did not ask specific questions that would allow determination of whether an answer was an adopted stereotype or one's own opinion). Maybe it is here, in mass media, that we have a solution to the puzzle of a greater acceptance of Cardinal Glemp than of the church.

The primate has not yet been an object of massive criticism, and that is why the level of disapproval of him personally remains low. Naturally, we should not exaggerate the role of the press. Regardless of mass media, there is internal church criticism now, which was never voiced during communism because of tactical reasons (one does not wash dirty laundry in public when dirt is thrown from outside). At the same time it is difficult not to see the opinion-shaping role of the press, especially, I think, in relation to the above question, which has so significantly divided our society.

What Does the Church Have To Say

In most general terms, we may distinguish four tendencies. The first one is a negative reaction to any criticism treating it as the hand of communism, or of cryptocommunism. According to this concept it is necessary to create a catholic state of the Polish nation and fight new cultural trends from the West, which only bring decadence and pornography.

The second reaction is accepting research results with calm. The church does not care for popularity. The lower its popularity the higher is its authenticity. The New Testament says that Christians are a "sign" who will meet resistance.

The third type of attitude is accepting the state of awareness as "the sign of the times" and a pastoral challenge to the church. The church should open up to

the surrounding world, accept pluralism, and continued reforms within itself. It should be concerned with new ways of teaching the truth of the New Testament, since being Christian means being human.

The fourth reaction is joining the chorus crooning about the changes. The cleaning up will be good for the church because it is the quality, not quantity, of faith that counts. This concept has pluralism, dialogue, and tolerance as the essence of Christianity, while its proponents "wink" at the heathens saying: "We are the same as you, with the exception that we believe in Our Lord, but this is our purely private business. We will certainly not try to convert you: do your own thing."

The internal Catholic discussion about the formula for the church's conduct and role in the pluralistic democratic society will be probably carried on mainly between proponents of the second and the third options. The other two are too far removed from *sensus catholicus*, either by turning religion into ideology, by losing its universal dimension, or by accepting faith as a totally private matter and renouncing any influence on culture and politics.

The future appears unclear. More and more, the situation of the church as an institution will be bound to the church as a community of the faithful. That is why the future of religion in Poland seems to be a topic as interesting, if not more, as the church's role in the political life of the republic. Undoubtedly, anticlericalism will grow stronger, secularization will become spontaneous, and morality will become more relative and subjective. A lot depends on the church's strategy and style. Will it wisely influence the new social order being formed, permeating it with Christian values and not merely Christian emblems?

One thing is certain: the elephant will not allow being kicked out of the china shop. Most probably, he will not allow being put in a corner, either. Political clericalism and anticlericalism may get some votes in the elections, but both seem to be detrimental to the future of Poland. We do not suffer from an overabundance of authority in our country, and maybe it is not worth totally devaluating that which exists. The press could do with more sophistication and attempt a serious debate about the church, while leaving behind discussions fit for an afternoon tea party. The church should remain an arbiter and not a side in political quarrels, for its own sake and the sake of all.

Survey on Church Role in Political Life

91EP0542B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
29-30 May 91 p 2

[Article by RW: "OBOP Survey: Church Role in Polish Life"]

[Text] The general opinion is that the stereotype "Pole equals Catholic" is not true. In OBOP [Center for

Research on Public Opinion] findings, 90 percent of those asked do not agree that only a Catholic can be a good Pole.

According to 86 percent of those interviewed, the Catholic Church plays a significant role in Polish political life. In the opinion of a majority this role is too great.

Still, almost 60 percent of respondents believe that the church's political activity in Poland is beneficial to the nation and serves its interests, but that percentage is considerably lower than in 1989 (77 percent).

Over three-fourths of the interviewed accept the principle of division between the church and the state. One in ten is of a contrary opinion. A majority believe that neither in the case of legislative or political decisions should the government be guided by the principles of the church's social teachings.

The general opinion is that the church should not be able to interfere in the publication of books or the showing of films inappropriate from the point of view of its teachings. A majority also believes that the church has no right to demand that people submit to its decisions in such matters as contraception (81 percent), abortion (71 percent), extramarital sex, and divorce. Only in the case of fasts does a majority admit the church's right to demand obedience. There should be no legal prohibition of divorces, according to 80 percent of those polled, nor prohibition of contraceptives, according to 88 percent.

Two-thirds of respondents are against the subsidizing of priests' salaries by the state, and almost half are against the State Budget assisting in the construction and maintenance of churches (38 percent is of a contrary opinion). In the case of financing religion classes in schools, opinions are divided: almost half of the interviewed expect the state to pay part of the costs, while a similar number oppose the idea.

To the question "In your opinion, what is the level of participation of the Catholic Church in the nation's political life?", responses were as follows

- Rather too much—38 percent
- As it should be—21 percent
- Rather too little—one percent
- Hard to say—four percent
- Definitely too much—36 percent
- Definitely too little—0 percent

New Duties, Constraints of Border Guards Defined

9/EP0556/ Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 8-9 Jun 91 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Marek Lisiecki, chief commandant of the Border Guard, main plenipotentiary for borders of the Republic of Poland, by Cezary Rudzinski, place and date not given: "Between the Odra and the Bug"]

[Text] [Rudzinski] The Border Guard Troops [WOP] have ceased to exist. Their place has been taken by the Border Guard [SG]. What does this mean, apart from a name change?

[Lisiecki] The WOP discontinued operations on 15 May of this year. The Border Guard began its service on 16 May, three days before the deadline set by the legislators. There is no longer a single WOP member at a border or in the headquarters anymore, apart from the soldiers of the former WOP in basic service from the fall draft who were taken in by the SG. In addition to career cadres, the SG consists, and will consist, of young people in volunteer candidate service as a form of alternative service, like in the police, in uniform prevention detachments.

The changes are much more profound. The functions and tasks of protecting the borders have changed. A typical military organization has been replaced by the border police—formations similar to those in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada—or something in between the political police and the disciplinary police. From among previous WOP tasks, guarding state borders and controlling border traffic have remained, but on a broader scale. The SG is at the same time the Office of Immigration, somewhat resembling that of Great Britain or the United States.

[Rudzinski] Our fellow citizens who were turned away from the border in these very states despite having valid visas may have unpleasant associations.

[Lisiecki] This is what the economic interest of the state requires. Even if a traveler has a valid Republic of Poland visa (we also have traffic without visas), this does not mean that he should be automatically allowed to enter Poland—for example, if he does not have money, an invitation, or a return ticket, but declares that he intends to stay in our country, for example, for a month. Where is he going to live and on what? This leads us to assume that "illegal" work, or an attempt to get through Poland to the West illegally, is the objective of his trip. This is why travelers without money are turned away at the borders and are not allowed to enter the Republic of Poland. This is mainly the case with Romanian citizens, but also with a couple of persons per week from other states, actually, similar to the manner in which Polish citizens without money are not allowed to enter Western states.

The Border Guard is entitled to act in this manner as well as to issue visas directly on the border, and to decide whether a Republic of Poland consular office abroad can issue a visa to a specific person when there are reservations with regard to this person. This follows from Poland joining Western Europe, as well as the signing of a treaty on readmission with the Schengen group of states. In the treaty, Poland undertook, among other things, to accept back all foreigners who have illegally entered any of these countries through our country.

In this manner, the border of West European states has shifted from the Odra to the Bug, as well as to the

Carpathian and Sudeten Mountains. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have not signed treaties on readmission with the West. Therefore, Poland, as the country of "first entry," is responsible, with all the ensuing financial consequences, for every foreigner who proceeds from our country to the West—of course, only if he does not have a legal German, French, etc. visa. This means a tremendous increase in the responsibilities of border control. Maintaining one European foreigner who is being deported from Poland for only five days, and subsequently sending him to his own country, results in costs of about 10 million zlotys. A longer stay in our country by an Asian or an African citizen, when, for example, it is necessary to determine his citizenship and deport him by plane, calls for expenditures by the state that are many times higher.

[Rudzinski] Therefore, this is an important function in protecting the economic interest of the state. Is it the only one?

[Lisiecki] Oh no! In addition to preventing illegal or undesirable entries into Poland by foreigners or their transportation, including organized transportation, to the West, especially to Sweden and Germany, through our territory (such attempts have been registered in the case of, for example, citizens of African and Asian states), the SG has the task of foiling organized smuggling, with particular emphasis on drugs and weapons.

Averting ecological dangers also belongs in the sphere of economic interest. The Border Guard is authorized to bar the entry to Poland of shipments of harmful substances and to turn them back.

[Rudzinski] This means duplicating the powers of the customs service....

[Lisiecki] Yes, because this has to do with making the sieve denser. Besides, the SG is also authorized to control the purity of border waters. In the case of the Baltic, where this is done in cooperation with the maritime offices, this means not only taking care of keeping waters free of pollution, but also of protecting the economic interest of Poland at sea—both preventing smuggling through this route and controlling foreign fleet vessels.

[Rudzinski] Are you prepared in terms of cadres, organization, equipment, and financing for accomplishing these new and, in combination, very crucial tasks?

[Lisiecki] The position of the Border Guard in the state structure has changed. The WOP command was actually a department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of sorts. On the other hand, the main commandant of the Border Guard is the head of a central office of state administration who personally reports to the prime minister (who appoints him) and functionally reports to the minister of internal affairs.

However, at the same time the personnel strength of the Border Guard service has been reduced by one-third,

specifically, from about 20,000 WOP soldiers to 13,500 functionaries of the Border Guard. This has not been done at the expense of basic units—Border Guard detachments and border-control posts or, in the case of the maritime border, divisions—but at the expense of "slimming down" headquarters. Authorized billets have been reduced in order to boost the weight of ranks in the Border Guard.

For example, out of 18 generals' billets of the WOP (15 after the recent elimination of the political department and certain territorial units), only two such billets remain in the Border Guard. Twenty-three colonels' billets remain out of 124. The situation is the same with lower billets. Noncommissioned and warrant officers are the basic executive corps and will remain so in the future, as in similar formations in the West.

[Rudzinski] Where did you get the people?

[Lisiecki] A majority of the cadres of the former WOP remained with the Border Guard, primarily young and middle-aged people. Older people, for whom it would have been difficult to adjust, or those who were very attached to the military nature of this organization, have left. We are training and retraining our cadres at the SG Training Center in Kietrzyn and in three training facilities for noncommissioned officers. The 13,500 personnel who are at the disposal of the Border Guard are in a position to accomplish the tasks set for them, provided that the organization of work and methods of achieving our goals change.

[Rudzinski] Which means?

[Lisiecki] We are switching from securing borders tightly, from a system of more frequent patrols, to operational and reconnaissance methods of work. Of course, patrols remain, but mainly for prevention. However, preventing and foiling the already-mentioned organized smuggling and transportation of people, as well as ecological danger, becomes the main objective, and in the sphere of protecting the economic interest of the state, the primary objective is excluding undesirable aliens from Poland.

We should add that the SG took over the responsibilities of the WOP for customs inspections at Class II and Class III border crossings, in local border traffic. These responsibilities will now increase. In 1990, our southern border was crossed about 2 million times within the framework of local border traffic. This year, upon the relaxation [of formalities], we expect a fivefold growth, or about 10 million people.

[Rudzinski] They say that each of our borders has its own peculiarities. How does the chief of the Border Guard view this?

[Lisiecki] The situation on the southern border is relatively stable. For now, the cancellation of the mandatory possession of invitations in traffic between the Republic of Poland and Czechoslovakia has not caused problems.

Traditional smuggling through the mountains continues. We will attempt to restrict its scope considerably. The opening of a new crossing in Cieszyn on 19 May, which incidentally was built with the money of the WOP-SG, has radically improved the traffic of passengers and freight in this region.

The movement on the eastern border is tremendous, mainly for trade purposes, but generally in a legal manner. However, the phenomenon of falsifying invitations to Poland in different forms is mounting, and because of this, about 50 people per day are turned back. Thorough inspections reveal cases in which some people carry as many as up to 100 blank invitations. We are considering the issue of invitations being confirmed by the police rather than the notaries.

So far, the eastern border has been closely guarded (a complete blockade and two protective "walls") on the Soviet side. However, we have apprehensions about what will happen when this system is dismantled as a remnant of the "iron curtain," and a complete opening to the world occurs. It is estimated that between several and a dozen or so million citizens of the USSR would like to get to jobs in the West. Meanwhile, the way to the West leads primarily through Poland. Actually, this is an international problem.

Some will not try the legal route, which, after all, is already apparent along the western border. Night after night, up to 50 people who attempt to cross the border illegally are apprehended and turned back. On occasion, there are more than 70 such attempts per night. These are mostly Romanian gypsies, but attempts are also made by citizens of other countries, including Asia and Africa.

[Rudzinski] Can you give us details?

[Lisiecki] Of course. This year, about 1,500 citizens of Romania, almost 800 of our citizens, and 350 Bulgarians have already been apprehended and turned back. About 60 Germans have been among the people caught in the act of crossing our border illegally, without passports, as well as amateurs of illegal travel to the West from a number of other countries: Albania, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Ghana, the Netherlands, India, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Liberia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, Ivory Coast, and even Great Britain.

[Rudzinski] How many of them are successful?

[Lisiecki] Actually very few, because if we do not catch them, the Germans, with whom we cooperate closely in this field, do.

[Rudzinski] What happens to those apprehended while attempting to cross the border illegally?

[Lisiecki] Because of the lack of a law on aliens, these people are referred to voivodes for an administrative visa, which imposes the duty to leave the Republic of Poland before the date set. However, virtually no one

controls this because there are no people to see to it. Even if an alien reports [to the voivode] and receives such an order, he once again attempts to get across the Odra or the Nysa. Voivodes should make a decision on deportation in such cases and instruct the police to execute it. However, there are no funds for this.

[Rudzinski] Therefore, is this a situation without a way out?

[Lisiecki] Only for the time being. We are planning to set up deportation detention centers, like in the West. However, this calls for a new law and funds for extradition. This is why it is so important to control individuals allowed to enter the Republic of Poland, and especially to turn back at the border those about whom it is known that they are attempting to travel further on without the necessary documents. We would like the SG to have the right to issue administrative visas with orders to leave Poland and the right to deport. If a violator has money, he should purchase the ticket with it; if he does not, this should be done at the expense of the state. We should see to it that he leaves.

[Rudzinski] The problem is that the state coffers are empty at present....

[Lisiecki] We are feeling it firsthand. Only one-half of our financial needs are met. There are no funds to build Border Guard barracks and service premises, to say nothing about aid to personnel in building apartments. Our computer system, which we need to streamline and expand considerably, is relatively efficient. However, we have, for example, the worst cars in the former Ministry of Internal Affairs, not a single helicopter, and old vessels from the Navy.

However, we believe that the difficulties are temporary, and every member of the SG is doing whatever he can in order to accomplish our tasks as efficiently as possible. We expect the decisionmakers to understand that saving on the Border Guard, which is negligible on the scale of the economy, will bring about tremendous losses. Outlays, for example, for 10 Border Guard barracks, several dozen cars, and one or two helicopters made at present may amount to a negligible fraction of the future losses of the state treasury if we have to maintain and deport hundreds or thousands of undesirable aliens because of having a not-too-tightly guarded border.

[Rudzinski] Thank you for the interview.

Unsatisfactory Quality of Hardware Noted

91EP05354 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 21
25 May 91 p 12

[Article by Roman Czejarek: "What Do We Have for Defense?"]

[Text] Even the best trained soldier will not be able to do anything if his equipment is considerably inferior to that of his enemy. The Polish Armed Forces [WP] found

itself in an adverse situation after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The Russians took away their warheads and left the WP with missile launchers and disarmed missiles. The former East Germans broke earlier cooperation agreements, which left the Polish Navy with empty hulls and no equipment. On top of this, while the national defense industry is in shambles, there is no money to buy modern defense systems. What hardware does our Army have at the moment, and what can it count on in the future?

According to data presented during the Vienna negotiations, the Polish Army has 2,850 tanks. The top-of-the-line model is the Soviet-licensed Polish-made T-72 tank. We have exactly 757 such vehicles. At all types of conferences as well as in domestic publications the tank has always been described as representing world standards and being comparable at least to the much-admired German Leopard-2. This may be considered true in terms of its traction, maneuverability, and strength. Unfortunately, the T-72 is greatly inferior to its Western counterparts in fire effectiveness. Leopard-2 and the American M1-A1 can fire accurately at targets from a distance of 2,500 meters in any, even the most difficult, weather conditions and at night, while our T-72, depending on conditions, can fight effectively only at less than half that distance. This means that in case of battle Polish soldiers would have to reach a 1,000-1,200 meter distance from the enemy. Before that, for about a minute, they would be exposed to accurate enemy fire. During that time a Leopard-2 may fire eight times.

Medium and Lower

Fortunately, no army consists of only ultramodern hardware. The newest tank models constitute up to 45 percent of the tank inventory only in the richest countries of the world. In our army it is 27 percent. Over 2,000 (2,035) Polish tanks are T-54's and T-55's, which were constructed in the 1950's, and some of which were later upgraded. In expert literature on the subject the old model is described as having 0.6-0.8 percent of the combat value of the T-72. Some tank crewmen say that the T-55, compared to a modern tank, is like a Trabant [car produced in the former GDR] after complete renovation compared to a modern car. There are also 58 old PT-76's—light amphibious tanks—which have reached the final stages of being eliminated.

The only vehicle fully comparable to the highest world class is the armored tracked transporter BWP-1. A small number of its new variety, the BWP-2, have also been introduced. Altogether we have 1,391 vehicles of this type. At the same time, the old and technically outdated armored wheeled transporters, the SKOT's, are being withdrawn from use. There are still 928 of them. Many of them are specially modified command and communications vehicles outfitted with special equipment. The Army still has a few other transport vehicles, mainly of the BRDM-2 type.

In the Air Force the leading combat aircraft is still the fighter MiG-21. We have 418 planes of this type, in several versions. In terms of construction, the MiG represents the standards of the early fifties. It lacks modern gear and indispensable maneuverability. Its only positive quality, which has little relevance for combat, is its low price. In the West, all planes of this class have long been withdrawn (the MiG-21 was usually compared to the American F-104). A definitely better plane is the variable-wing geometry fighter MiG-23. Our sources say that we have only 37 of these planes. The West has counted almost 100 of them. It is a plane of a medium class, comparable to the popular and constantly modernized Phantom F-4. The only planes that our pilots can fly without complexes are MiG-29's. Unfortunately, we have only a few of these. The last five probably reached the Vistula in October 1990.

We do not have any typical bomber aircraft. Their function is carried out by the quite good assault plane Su-22 (we have 105) and the somewhat older Su-20 (we have 20). Particularly bad is WP's inventory of antitank helicopters. This most popular means of attack and defense, tested in the Persian Gulf war (the excellent American AH-64 Apache destroyed columns of Iraqi T-854's), constitutes a significant force of any respectable army. We have only 29 of the medium-class Soviet assault helicopter Mi-24.

Only the Orzel

The Polish Navy is a strange conglomeration of ships of different classes and types. The biggest unit is the outdated missile-carrying destroyer ORP [Ship of the Polish Republic] Warszawa. Although it has been under our colors for a rather short time, it had earlier served in the Soviet fleet for many years. It was designed at the turn of the 1950's. One of the 20 twin ships of this type sank in the Black Sea in 1974 because of an explosion, and almost 300 people were killed.

A rather modern "Eastern" technology is represented by the four missile corvettes: the ORP Gornik, the Hutań, the Metalowiec, and the Rolnik. Because of low finances we could afford only ships with the simplest and cheapest equipment (the Russians offer several models for sale), which means, among other things, that the Polish Navy has always been inferior to any fleet of a Baltic country.

The main assault force is constituted of three submarines. Only one of them, the ORP Orzeł, is a unit satisfying world requirements. The other two, the Wilk and the Dzik, are old, noisy, and outdated submarines that are gradually being withdrawn from the Soviet Navy. All three are definitely too large for conditions in the Baltic Sea. They were designed for oceans, and their use in our sea may be at least cumbersome. Our neighbors, e.g. Germany, build or buy much smaller submarines, and have many more of them.

Good technical level is represented by domestically built transport and mine-laying ships of the Lublin type (five)

and new minesweepers of the Notec type (another four being built) with hulls made of fiberglass. The rest of the Polish fleet is composed of older units, reminiscent of the early 1960's. Some of them are already at a ship-breaking yard.

In other types of hardware the situation is not any better. The artillery still makes use of World War II-vintage equipment. An exception here are the 152-mm mobile howitzers of the Dana type. Weapons of a fairly modern level are: shooting armament, antiaircraft missiles of the Asa type, and Polish radiolocation stations, the so-called NUR families.

Theoretically, the simplest source of hardware is buying abroad. In 1991, MON [Ministry of National Defense], financed by the State Treasury, can spend approximately six trillion zlotys for preliminary purchases of a wide range of military technology (including its operation). Even saying that it is a "budget of agony" is too soft a statement.

First, the time is gone when our main supplier, the Soviet Union, dumped prices for political reasons. India was the last to take advantage of this dumping when it bought MiG-29's for two million dollars each! Today the Russians want \$18 million for the same plane, and the newest version (with Doppler impulse radar and pilot's electronic display—the same as in the American F-18) offered by the Swiss Avia-Export is \$25 million. Second, there is no certainty that we will buy in the East.

West European or American hardware costs even more, although prices are comparable to Russian ones. For self-guided air-to-air missiles, the cost is from \$37,000 (for the R27R1—made in the USSR) to \$503,000 (the AIM-120—made in the United States). The M-1-A1 Abrams tank, famous from the Gulf, costs \$3.72 million, and the German Leopard-2 costs \$2.64 million, but our domestic T-72 is almost ten times less.

The simple conclusion is that, to the extent possible, we have to make use of hardware manufactured domestically. A radar-system station, NUR (\$5 million), is half the price of a similar station made in United States. The Polish antitank guided missile 9M14M is three to seven times cheaper than its Western counterparts.

Troubles With Power Drive

Unpleasant as it may be, we have to clearly realize that a lot of domestic products are simply unfit for the Army. A classical example here is... cars. The WP gave up buying the Polonez [Polish-produced car] last year, and if FSO [Automobile Plant] does not come up with a better car the Army is ready to find a supplier abroad. The first tests of foreign cars have already been done.

In case of other, more sophisticated equipment, experts have been arguing for months about the suitability of the new combat training jet plane, the PZL [Polish Aviation Plant] I-22 Tryda. It is the first plane of this type completely designed in Poland. It comes after a very long

stalemate (caused by the government's erroneous decisions that led to a dissolution of the construction team of the PZL TS-11 Iskra). The problem is that the rather good plane lacks a good power system. The plane performs badly, and the manufacturer, having no choice, installs modified but old engines.

A similar problem was encountered by the creators of a new military cross-country car marked PW. In this case, international cooperation came to the rescue, and the vehicle is now tested with an engine made by the Italian firm INVECO. Unfortunately, besides Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and recently Romania, other countries outside the Warsaw Pact are not willing to start closer cooperation. Officially, 85 percent of advanced-technology sale restrictions, the so-called COCOM, in force until recently, have been lifted. In reality, according to experts from the WP technology inspection department, in direct talks it always turns out that the lift refers only to products of civilian use. Only the United States, at Poland's request, promised to possibly consider specific cases in the future. Other countries, for example Japan, do not even want to discuss the matter.

It is currently public knowledge that the famous case of Polish purchases of American Falcon F-16 fighters is, at least for now, out of the question. The friendly U.S. Government did not give its consent. There are problems in other cases as well. It is amazing how the costs jump depending on the geographical and political location of a country.

The American armored personnel carrier, the M113A3 costs \$201,000, but South Korea had to pay \$697,000 each. The excellent French Mirage 2000 fighter, worth \$26 million, was priced at 70 million for the Iraqis. In this latter case, however, the cost of training and technical inspection was added. Another case, our attempt to find a supplier of thermovision systems, fell through.

A totally different, although critical, matter is the sudden breaking of contracts by some of our former suppliers. The Soviet Union has refused to sell many parts and oils and lubricants not produced in Poland. As a consequence, our Army, uncertain of foreign weapons maintenance possibilities, gave up earlier plans of purchases. The Russians took away warheads previously kept on Polish territory. These elements were to be distributed in case of war with other countries. As a result, we are left with missile launchers (the famous SCUD's, among others) and missiles but without the most important element—the impact charge. In addition, all this gear has been designed for a nuclear war. What do we do in this peculiar situation now? Most probably we will try to buy some conventional warheads, but will we succeed?

Friend or Foe

Together with our East German partner we were to manufacture navy guns and navy rocket systems. East Germany disappeared and we are left, for instance, with the frigate Kaszub, which lacks armament. During tests the ship was found to have malfunctions and errors in

construction. We also have the above-mentioned hulls of ships of design 151, which we do not quite know what to do with.

In only one case can we say that something bad has turned out to our advantage. The Soviet Union, in spite of earlier contracts, refused to sell us electronic systems which identify aircraft as "friend or foe." These systems, indispensable in every army, automatically inform a pilot whether the plane he is aiming at is ours or the enemy's. Because the equipment is indispensable, we will have to design it ourselves. This has turned out to our advantage since we would not have much use for a system known to an alien country, which could then deceive us into taking its planes for our own.

Until now, the Polish Army hardware had been bought because of a specific political doctrine and economic factors. These are the reasons why, instead of investing in defense, we built more than 20 landing ships that are up to the highest standards. Today we have to get rid of them, but only three years ago we were assured they would be used in a decisive counterattack landing on the Jutland peninsula. Equally superfluous are various river-crossing means stored in great supply. Using only box girder bridges we could, in keeping with previous requirements, cover all the rivers all the way from the Oder to the Rhine.

At present, priority should be given to air defense, antitank defense, mine systems, command centers, communications, radiolocation, and computer science. International agreements bind us to withdraw part of our tanks, transporters, and planes. Older types of hardware will thus be eliminated. At the same time, conditions permitting, we should find money to buy additional pieces; for instance, in the case of assault helicopters, we may have as many as 130.

Where to get the money? Military people joke that the best way is to sell the old hardware. Some old tanks have been bought by farmers (apparently they are excellent for pressing cabbage, specially on big farms). A greater demand for it, however, is among Western collectors and museums, to whom our Army is a virtual storage of working museum pieces. The first orders for T-55's and MiG-21's have been received.

Additional Imports of Soviet Oil Reported

*LD0207231191 Warsaw PAP in English 1710 GMT
2 Jul 91*

[Text] Warsaw, July 2—Poland will buy additional 2-3 million tons of Soviet oil following an agreement signed here Tuesday between the Ciech Polish enterprise and the Soyuz-Neflexport of the Soviet Union. The Soviet partner is willing to negotiate further supplies.

A contract signed earlier this year envisaged imports of only 4 million tons of Soviet oil. In the first half of this year Ciech bought 0.5 billion dollars worth of Soviet oil.

Until recently, Poland used to buy 11-12 million tons of oil in the Soviet Union but the supplies dropped after the two countries passed to settling accounts in convertible currencies.

Health Service Needs 4 Billion Zlotys

*AU0407135391 Warsaw PAP in English 2120 GMT
1 Jul 91*

[Text] Warsaw, July 1—Minister of Health Wladyslaw Sidorowicz told a press conference on Monday [1 July] that the medicine market was getting back to normal in Poland and that drug stores will receive dues for free-of-charge and discount prescriptions by the end of July.

According to Minister Sidorowicz the health service needs at least 4 billion zlotys more to survive till the end of this year. The ministry has already applied to the government for the subsidy.

Sidorowicz reported that preparations are being made for radical transformations of the health service. The new system is to become effective next year. Family doctor centres are planned to be created in a number of provinces this year.

Also today, during the meeting with the interhospital coordinating committee of the health service employees protest action. Minister Sidorowicz pledged to present the initial schedule of the implementation of the health service reform in 1992 by September 30.

Dijmarescu Explains Call for Early Elections

91B40861C Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 13 Jun 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of economy and finance, by Liana Simion; place and date not given:
"I Very Seriously Considered Resigning"]

[Text] [Simion] Minister, last week you made a statement that stirred heated comments. You suggested holding general legislative elections in the fall. What prompted you to "step forward" so sharply?

[Dijmarescu] I proceeded from the fact that the question of general elections was discussed already at the FSN [National Salvation Front] convention in March. The need for elections, in conjunction with a possible government reshuffle, became very clear, especially after the first attempt, which was a semifiasco. A credible national government reflects the wishes of the electorate expressed through the legislative power. I wonder whether a different government could emerge from the current Parliament structure. At the present stage, after the debates on the Constitution theses, drafting it could take no more than two weeks. Then it could be published and broadly debated, and by the middle of August the Constitution could be finalized. Indeed, at the time I expressed the viewpoint of several of my colleagues in the cabinet and I think that we would do well to do it now, when the executive power is contested by many trade union centrals and when the political, economic, and social realities compel us to honestly face our problems. The provisions of the electoral bill are clear. The president designates the prime minister from among the majority party. Does the party now have an alternative to Petre Roman? Coming back to what I said, I think that we should cease our unconditional obedience to the party. In view of the socioeconomic realities, the relations between the government, the FSN, and the Parliament make it necessary to give freedom of expression both to the members of the executive and of the legislative branch, just like to all the other citizens in the country.

[Simion] Nevertheless, Mr. Birladeanu denied you this right and requested explanations only from the prime minister.

[Dijmarescu] Yes, Mr. Birladeanu seriously denied me the right to speak up about elections and other issues. Does it mean that the government or the citizenry may ask a Parliament member to openly express his own viewpoint concerning the executive or the legislative branch only with the permission of the Senate president? In a state of law no one can forbid his fellow citizens the right to free expression, for any reason. A few of us in the government believe that we need to clarify the situation inside the country, in other words to hold an electoral consultation as soon as possible.

[Simion] A few? Can you name them?

[Dijmarescu] If I told you their names it could be construed that the government is divided into two groups, a "dissident" group that favors elections and a conservative group. Those of us who hold the position that the reform must be confronted with the Romanian social reality must also assume the responsibility for doing a better job of it.

[Simion] So we're dealing with the core of professionals...

[Dijmarescu] In a way, yes, but there are also those who from reform technicians are beginning to turn into politicians.

[Simion] After a wave of comments, the FSN Executive Bureau agreed only with local elections. Mr. Petre Roman said that from a technical viewpoint it is not possible to finalize the Constitution by fall, while President Iliescu described your proposal as unrealistic. Weren't you actually left out in the cold?

[Dijmarescu] Indeed, I was clearly left out in the cold. At such moments, when you find yourself isolated from the rest, one's only thought is to leave such a team...

[Simion] Resign?

[Dijmarescu] Yes, resign. I have very seriously considered it.

[Simion] At the end of last week?

[Dijmarescu] Of course. I must tell you that I informed the prime minister of my intention along this line.

[Simion] How did he react?

[Dijmarescu] Mr. Petre Roman asked me to stay in the government. To stay for the time being, I would add.

[Simion] May I emphasize this "for the time being"?

[Dijmarescu] Yes. It does not have the same connotation as previous letters of resignation. The ministers in question were asked by the prime minister to stay in the executive for a given period of time. In everything I stated at the press conference concerning the discussions with representatives of the European Community, of other states and governments, and of banking and business circles, I noted that both Romania's progress and its failures are well known abroad. It is not a question of the Common Market compelling us to hold an election, as it was said in one article. I simply took that good opportunity to present to the nation a few of our concerns, a few of Romania's current major problems that we, cabinet members, see extremely clearly, as does Parliament and any member of the public.

[Simion] You availed yourself of a pretext in order to dot the "i's".

[Dijmarescu] In the immediate future I expect people to become aware of the need for measures of economic policy that will be discussed in the cabinet. I think that

the press conference also made it clear that in the economy we find ourselves back to the point from which we started in December 1989. Everything we tried to solve by balancing the relation between salaries-prices-commodities is back to zero. That means that corrections are necessary. My opinion was that in view of what lies ahead of us, the best idea is for the electorate to decide. We must find out whether a mere change of government can change the economic policy or make it more credible. We need political support. The question is: Does the reconcentration of political forces in the post-electoral period still ensure the same representation for the current Parliament and for the electorate's option as such? Frankly, the government will have to take unpopular measures, and without political support, the reform is at an impasse.

Free Democratic Party Leader Nica Interviewed

91BA0861A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
18-19 Jun 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Nica Leon, chairman of the Free Democratic Party, by Neli Luchian; place and date not given: "There Is No Opposition in Romania"]

[Text] [Luchian] You have repeatedly stated that during the revolution you could have become president of the country. Do you think you still have such a chance?

[Nica] The way the situation is now, no. First I tried to save the people and then organize what needed organizing, but Iliescu came in with his trained pals and monopolized the power. I have been accused by many people that I'm after power, because I said directly and honestly that I wanted to become president of Romania. But I don't want that for myself. I've always had a good life and I can have a good life anywhere. With what I do I can be appreciated anywhere in the world, but the people need me. But without their help I can't do anything, anything I could do by myself, I did.

[Luchian] What do you think are the qualities required of a political leader?

[Nica] To be a Romanian, to be a good manager, to be honest, and if possible, incorruptible.

[Luchian] That is not a must?

[Nica] Yes it is, but it's difficult to expect it after 45 years of dictatorship.

[Luchian] And how is Nica Leon?

[Nica] A Romanian, although the rumor was once that I was a Gypsy, another time that I was Jewish. I began to deal in politics in 1979 when I was working for CTC [Technical Quality Control] Cinescopes. I stood up against an order that what was not written down in the norm was a reject and couldn't be used.

[Luchian] I am interested in your qualities as a political leader

[Nica] I am a Romanian, and I am honest and incorruptible. That must be evident from my actions.

[Luchian] Are you a misunderstood man?

[Nica] No. That is to say, yes. Because no one understood me when I was in the CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council], nor before the elections. I tried to teach those so-called eminent politicians—Coposu, Campeanu—what to do for the opposition to win the elections, but they refused, saying they didn't need lessons from me.

[Luchian] What is your opinion of the current politicians?

[Nica] It's very bad. Mr. Iliescu is a nothing; if I were as stupid as he is I'd hang myself. Petre Roman is the son of a criminal who abused the people. I don't know how much experience Mr. Coposu had in politics, but he has not shown himself to be the eminent politician presented by his party. As for Mr. Campeanu, the same thing. I wouldn't hire him even as porter for our party. Mr. Ratiu is a nice old man, overtaken by politics, who mistakes our original democracy with London democracy. But between the two there is a lot of difference. I have a very bad opinion of Marian Munteanu. I've met him; I usually form an opinion of people by watching them at work; what counts are a person's public actions, not what he tells the world. His actions are negative. I was called up, and I said that for the University Square film. But that was not shown, which goes to prove that not only the television applies censorship, but also the so-called independent media. I expressed my thanks to Mr. Gulea, although I didn't understand why they invited me and wasted their time on me. I think that the University Square was the creation of the FSN [National Salvation Front], which it used to scare off 80 percent of the country's population. Marian Munteanu was one of the stage directors; he was ordered to do what he did, he was not a patriot and a revolutionary. He belongs to a service that he respects and obeys. There he was shouting death to the Communists and down with communism, but in the same script, when he appeared on television with Comrade Campeanu, he said: Brothers, if we win the elections we thought we would punish between 200,000 to 400,000 Communists. So when Maria and Florica, whose husbands had been paying the membership fee for 20 years, heard that these guys were thinking of punishing...Mr. Iliescu speaks nicely and smiles nicely, so they voted for him. Let's get back to the leaders. Tici Dumitrescu has difficulties grasping what current politics is all about. He didn't listen to me, but later he called me up and said: "You were right." Others? Bacanu is playing along in 1,000 games just to make sure that he has it good. I wouldn't mind a discussion with him and with Mr. Iliescu before the media, so I can tell them what mistakes they're making and in what tremendous games they've landed. I'd like them to ask me what I want, so I can tell them. But then I want to ask them some questions, too.

[Luchian] So you don't appreciate anyone?

[Nica] Among the ones who asserted themselves under Ceausescu and after the revolution I like Radu Filipescu's position very much.

[Luchian] You don't believe in the opposition?

[Nica] There is no opposition in Romania.

[Luchian] You don't think it has any chance?

[Nica] None.

[Luchian] You seem to be very categorical, even harsh. Regarding the current press, are you not bothered by its language?

[Nica] No. Even your newspaper has said a whole lot of shocking things about me. I will accept your apologies when you will realize your mistake. The so-called opposition newspapers don't mention me. It would be a pity to let certain people, or even the nation, become aware of me.

[Luchian] Do you think that you are being trivialized?

[Nica] Obviously. I am the target of a campaign.

[Luchian] That may explain why your party gave up a number of protest demonstrations which it used to systematically organize: "If it's Saturday, it's Nica Leon!"

[Nica] We didn't give them up. But as long as the people are not on our side and don't understand what we want, there is no point in struggling, certainly not in the street, because the same people kept coming to these demonstrations, and often people were sent who came up with things we didn't want. So, rather than discredit a beautiful idea, better give up.

[Luchian] What exactly is your party doing at present?

[Nica] Trying to survive.

[Luchian] Are you dreaming of other alliances?

[Nica] Yes. I was probably the only one in the country to forge the first alliances, trying to unite the so-called historical parties and to turn this political spectrum into a single party with a classical structure, with a single leader, and with a democratically selected name. Unfortunately, the old men have still not learned about politics and they reject that.

[Luchian] Do you have your own version of government?

[Nica] Yes. If today we were called upon to govern, we could do it.

[Luchian] If there are elections in the fall, what chances do you think the Free Democratic Party has?

[Nica] Not too many, because people still haven't woken up and it will probably be a while before people realize

that we were the ones who did everything in our power to defend and represent their interests.

[Luchian] Would it be correct to talk of a rift between you and the other participants in the revolution?

[Nica] No. Except that I'm not asking for any material perks. I am against Law No. 42. Let them pay pensions to the survivors of those who died, but I do not agree with tax exemptions and advantages for those who were in the revolution or were arrested. Some of them just happened to be passing by. Besides, a citizen has obligations, too, not just rights. One of these obligations is to defend their country. We did our duty as citizens. That was something our parents didn't grasp. After the revolution they once again brought us back to the same spot.

[Luchian] Is your private life satisfactory, considering your great responsibilities?

[Nica] Yes. Fortunately, my wife is a special person who understands me, although she is very much afraid for me. She was scared before, too, when I used to write things that the regime didn't like. But she understands me. I have a little girl who is also on my side, who also has a revolutionary spirit. They support me.

Tokes Interview Covers Broad Range of Issues

91BA0856A Brasov GAZETA DE TRANSILVANIA
in Romanian 30, 31 May 91

[Interview in two sections with Bishop Laszlo Tokes, honorary president of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania, by Adrian Popescu; place and date not given: "As Long as the Nomenklaturists Have Their Interests and Public Opinion Is Being Manipulated, There Are No Real Chances of Understanding Between the Romanians and Hungarians"]

[30 May pp 1-2]

[Text] [Popescu] I suggest we have a "no holds barred" discussion, OK?

[Tokes] Of course.

[Popescu] You are a high ranking figure in the church and at the same time, you are the honorary president of a political party and the spiritual leader of an ethnic minority. How do you reconcile your activities as a servant of the church with political activism? Aren't the two incompatible?

[Tokes] According to the Protestant concept, especially that of the Reform Church and thinking, there is no substantial contradiction between political and ecclesiastical activities. In fact, if we stop to think, not only protestantism or the Reform Church, but all churches, including the Orthodox Church, engage in politics in their own way. If you want actual examples, then in the centuries in which they struggled for national emancipation, the Orthodox clerics engaged in politics; there were even some bishops—for example the representatives of

the Transylvanian School—who were members of the Transylvanian Diet. So I don't think this is either something incompatible or rare.

[Popescu] Your name was and continues to be symbolically linked to the December 1989 revolution. However, from being a symbol you have become a controversial figure under attack. How do you explain that?

[Tokes] I believe that the attacks against me stem basically from a preconceived desire of the extremists to slander me. On the other hand, another reason is that I am not understood. First of all, the concept and thinking of the Transylvanian Hungarians as a whole are not understood, so I am not an exception. Second, democracy is still not understood and is still contested in our country, which makes me even less of an exception, because not only our Hungarians, but the members of the Romanian opposition are also not understood. Third, I am not good at expressing myself in the Romanian language so as to be rightly understood. Many misunderstandings arose from this elementary reason, but I hope that in time the Romanian public will realize that when all is said and done, I am faithful and loyal to the Romanian state and to Romania's cause, and then the reasons for which I am attacked will disappear.

[Popescu] In view of the declarations you made to the press on various occasions—like the ones you made while you were in the hospital in Hungary and subsequently—and also in view of the contents of the book *With God for the People* [title given in English] published in the United States, you are being accused of an anti-Romanian attitude; accusations which culminated in a request voiced in Parliament to put you on trial. What can you tell us about that?

[Tokes] First of all I firmly deny, from the bottom of my conscience, any anti-Romanian attitude. This accusation is the result of interpretation, because any criticism of Romania's official policy, or interpretations of its history, not to mention others, and all my pronouncements along that line were taken to mean that I am anti-Romanian. I think I have a right to think about the history of Transylvania, or of Romania, or of Hungary, and of the relations between them, differently than the Romanian school of history. In my opinion these matters could be simplified if they were not interpreted in a biased way because certain groups thinking a certain way.

[Popescu] You attended the Eger seminar organized by certain Hungarian nongovernmental organizations and associations of the Hungarian diaspora. At one point you said there: "Transylvania is in deadly peril!" Can you explain the meaning of that assertion?

[Tokes] Yes, it's very simple. First of all, the Romanian translation of the sentence in question was not correct...

[Popescu] I want to point out that I saw the tape of the Hungarian language broadcast and the statement in question was there.

[Tokes] As far as I know, the translation was not correct; the phrase was taken out of context and that led to a biased interpretation of the text. I still claim that from the viewpoint of the Hungarians of Transylvania, Transylvania is in danger, between inverted commas. When I think of the entire territory inhabited by Hungarians, we are losing Transylvania. I am not referring to borders, because I have no illusions in that respect. I would not even dream of saying anything about that, in the sense of disputing the borders.

[Popescu] So it was only a metaphor, as a Hungarian friend of mine suggested? Or were you referring to a real danger, and if so, what is that danger?

[Tokes] It is self-evident that the statement in question should not be taken literally. But I do think that unless we stop certain processes—such as assimilation and emigration—and if extremist propaganda and policies continue, they will in time lead to the disappearance of the Hungarians from Transylvania. I'm not saying that in 50 years there will be as few of us as there are Jews. It could happen, although I can't picture how such a disappearance would occur in practice. Generally speaking, my statement stands, with the caveat that I was referring only to the Hungarian minority. In fact, I have no reason to think that anyone understood that Transylvania in general was in danger of disappearing.

[Popescu] You mentioned the dangers threatening the Hungarian minority. What are actually these immediate dangers?

[Tokes] At present the greatest danger is the pressure of the provocations staged by extremists with the support of the official position of the party in power, that is aimed at making the Hungarians emigrate and leave their native land. If the situation does not change radically in the country, hundreds of thousands of people could be prompted to emigrate, as is the case in the USSR.

[Popescu] The beginning of your ecclesiastical career is linked to the city of Brasov. As you may know, some publications circulated the idea that during the time you lived in Brasov you were connected with the Securitate. What is the truth?

[Tokes] Who wasn't connected with the Securitate? I mean in the sense that we were followed, especially we, clerics. It was in a way a second consecration. Each one of us was followed and questioned and subjected to all kinds of pressure. In that sense, yes, I was in frequent contact with the Securitate, as I was always watched. But I'm not trying to deny the rumors at any cost, namely, the accusation which first appeared in RENASTEREA BANATEANA, behind which stands Iosif Constantin Dragan, as is known; there is no point, because they will continue to attack me anyway.

[Popescu] Mr. Tokes, intensive efforts are being made to reestablish the EMKE [Cultural Organization of Transylvanian Hungarians] organization. Will the restored

organization have the same objectives as those of the organization that existed 100 years ago?"

[Tokes] Mr. Raul Sorban talked about EMKE in a television program about Transylvania during the Eger campaign. he claimed that in fact EMKE was an irredentist organization, because when it was founded in 1896, if I'm not mistaken, its program featured the idea that Transylvania was part of Hungary, considering the name of the organization itself, which in Romanian translates as "Cultural Organization of Hungarians in Transylvania." However, Mr. Sorban forgot that EMKE continued to exist even after the Trianon Peace Treaty, so it could no longer have anything to do with Transylvania as part of Hungary since Transylvania was integrated into Romania. Consequently, Mr. Sorban's bias is obvious. This whole story seems ridiculous to me!

[Popescu] But the program of the EMKE organization did feature the principle of turning the Romanians in Transylvania into Hungarians.

[Tokes] That may have been the case at that time. But today's Hungarian population is not aware of that program, so to us, EMKE does not bear that significance, which only Mr. Sorban perceives. I wonder how we were supposed to "Hungarize" anything in today's Romania. That's not even an issue! EMKE dropped the idea of "Hungarization" from its objectives already in 1920, so logically it doesn't have any such objectives at this time.

[Popescu] As was evident at the Congress, you are one of the supporters of the radical group within the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania]. This time the radicals lost big in the confrontation with the moderates. Don't you think that in the current social and political context in Romania such radicalism risks, on the one hand, to produce a serious schism in the UDRM, and on the other, to deepen the conflicts with the Romanian majority and feed its suspicions?

[Tokes] I don't think that the radical wing has lost. In my opinion, the votes, which were almost equal on both sides, was a clear—albeit relative—victory for the radicals. I think they lost the ballot because they failed to present a correct image. But the process of radicalization continues and it is only a matter of time before it becomes predominant in the UDMR. The danger of a schism is real, but I am almost positive that even the radicals will not sacrifice unity for the sake of radicalism at any cost. If we consider the overall situation, what had to happen, happened, namely, we came one step closer to radicalism.

[31 May pp 1, 3]

[Text] [Popescu] Is it possible that behind the dispute between moderates and radicals there are personal rivalries and interests among the UDMR leadership? And at the same time, does it indicate a break between the leadership and the mass of members, as was said at the Congress?

[Tokes] I think that personal considerations may only color the real situation, but they are not important. They exist, but they are not dominant. What is important is the ideas and thinking represented by the two wings, the moderates and the radicals. It is true that the leadership is in a way removed from the masses, but that is not a UDMR special, it exists in all the parties, both here and in Hungary, and among parties whose base is not among the masses

[Popescu] Mr. Tokes, how do you see the current and future relations between the UDMR and Vatra Romaneasca [UVR] and PU'NR [Romanian National Unity Party]? The second part of the question is, what do you think in general about the future of the relations between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania?

[Tokes] I think that when it comes to the UVR and the PU'NR we cannot even talk of relations. I am against relations with such extremists. In Western countries they would be banned from politics by law. I think that overtly or covertly, the PU'NR and the UVR are the kind of organizations that should be excommunicated, of course not in the medieval sense of the word. Just as the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] as such was not allowed to be reorganized, these organizations should be eliminated, too; not arbitrarily, but on the basis of facts and democratically. Our relations with the Romanian population are predicated by the propaganda and manipulations carried out by various political forces. Unfortunately, not only the UVR and the PU'NR, but the Front, too, sacrificed a lot to its power interests. I am convinced that many of the Front representatives don't think consistently with their public positions. At the time of the elections the Front had every interest to arrive at compromises with extremists, chauvinists, and nationalists in order to win votes and stay in power. As long as these power interests and this kind of propaganda continue to exist, as long as the nomenklaturists have their own interests, and as long as the public opinion continues to be manipulated, there are no chances of real understanding between the Hungarians and Romanians. But already there are signs that the Romanian opposition is organizing and gaining in strength, which gives us hope.

[Popescu] Mr. Tokes, do you believe that the present structures of state power, including the Army, the police, and the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] are hostile to the Hungarian minority or to the UDMR?

[Tokes] In my opinion these bodies are not anti-Hungarian by their nature, but they are being manipulated for anti-Hungarian purposes. In fact, the struggle is against democracy and social change and for rescuing the *nomenklatura*, and the attitude to the Hungarian population serves the same purposes.

[Popescu] Can you comment in short on the situation of the Romanian minority in Hungary?

[Tokes] I think that unfortunately the Romanians living in Hungary have become assimilated beyond the point of

no return. As far as I know, only about 30,000 still speak Romanian. The Hungarian state could save the identity of that minority only by means of a positive discrimination, by providing special support and rights, which I think may happen in the future. I think we are entitled to demand that from the Hungarian state.

[Popescu] Numerically, the Hungarian minority is by far the strongest ethnic minority in Romania. One of the claims against it is that because of their number they view themselves as an elite minority entitled to speak in the name of all the other minorities. What do you think of that accusation?

[Tokes] I am not aware of any such Hungarian claims, nor do I agree with any such thing.

[Popescu] What do you think of the positions of certain Hungarian circles and organizations in Western Europe, America, and Australia who stubbornly push the idea of Transylvania's autonomy and its reannexation to Hungary?

[Tokes] I think that the importance of these Hungarian circles has been exaggerated. The relation between those groups and the position of the Hungarians in general, including Hungary, is similar to the relation between the number of Romanians in Hungary and of Hungarians in Romania. In my opinion, the importance attached to those extremist Hungarian circles has been exaggerated on purpose. Unfortunately there is both Hungarian and Romanian extremism and neither of them do us any good. I have said that more than once in the West, and I was even attacked by some Hungarian extremist circles. Except that these Hungarian extremists don't really dare go too far because my prestige is so high among Hungarians in Transylvania and Hungary that they realize that they could lose the little credibility they enjoy if they rise against me.

[Popescu] You are probably familiar with Hajdu Gyozo's idea about establishing an organization for reconciliation between Romanians and Hungarians, called Together. Why did it cause irritation among the congress delegates?

[Tokes] I view Hajdu Gyozo as a traitor to his nation and I don't even want to talk about him. It is still not clear who is using this person, who doesn't have the support of even 1 percent of the Hungarians in Transylvania, so he is of no consequence. In fact, his idea on television was a fresh diversion staged by the authorities. After the Eger diversion, the Hajdu Gyozo diversion!

[Popescu] Mr. Tokes, it is being consistently said that the UDMR receives its financing from outside. Is that true?

[Tokes] No, it is not true! We received material aid for orphanages and schools, but the party is not financially supported from outside.

[Popescu] After the tragedy of March 1990, the idea of an anti-Hungarian pogrom in Targu Mures was circulated in the West. The truth was subsequently established, but it was too late and too ineffective. Once launched, the idea of the pogrom caught on and clung to people's minds in the West. What are your thoughts on that?

[Tokes] I want to be precise about this issue. I believe that there was an attempted pogrom, which, however, failed. The organizers, those who staged the events in Targu Mures, meant to cause a confrontation between Romanians and Hungarians throughout Transylvania. We know for sure about some localities where such things were attempted, for example in Satu Mare, where the attempt was the most evident, but it failed. The epicenter of the provocation throughout Transylvania was supposed to be in Targu Mures, but in the end the action was contained because of the peaceful coexistence of Romanians and Hungarians, who in the end could not be provoked to the point of killing each other en masse.

[Popescu] In the same connection, in March 1990 several thousands of Hungarians came to celebrate 15 March in Romania. Don't you think that that contributed to exacerbating the tension, or do you think that at the time the regime only exploited the opportunity in order to implement the plan you mentioned?

[Tokes] I think that the arrival of the Hungarians from Hungary didn't play any role in the whole thing; the main role was played by the false reports circulated about their visit, which contributed to raising the tension. Those tourists didn't have anything to do with it and their presence was used; it provided a pretext for curtailing traffic between Romania and Hungary, which is still the case at present. We are back to the previous situation, when one had to wait 10-15 hours at the border to cross into Hungary. I personally, and my wife, were harassed at the border and we protested. The day before yesterday my sister Estera was also harassed and insulted; she was accused of being an irredentist, and so forth...

[Popescu] Among its other official documents, the UDMR congress adopted a letter appeal by Elod Kincses to the Romanian government...

[Tokes] I was not there when it was read. I don't know what's in it...

[Popescu] If you say so. But Elod Kincses is currently on trial in Romania for incitement to genocide in connection with the March 1990 events in Targu Mures. Will the adoption of that letter as a congress document not be viewed as a challenge to the Romanians, and will it not contribute to escalating the tensions between the UDMR and Romanian political parties, and between Romanians and Hungarians?

[Tokes] I'm sorry that Elod Kincses has left the country. His gesture was expected by the UVR and its sympathizers and that is why they filed an action against him. I am positive that if he hadn't left there would have been no court action against him. That's the same as in my case: I am vilified and slandered for national betrayal and so forth, but I face the attacks, I stay home, and no one is bringing action against me. I think that the other Romanian parties don't attach too much importance to Elod Kincses and his case. Only if the case is exaggerated will tension appear around it.

[Popescu] How do you think that the situation of the ethnic minorities, not only the Hungarian but all the minorities, will develop in the near future in Romania?

[Tokes] Unfortunately we cannot really expect any radical change in the Romanian leadership's political attitude toward the minorities and the minorities issue. Its solution is dragged out and there are attempts to manipulate it. If the Front were to take a firm stand, as it did in January 1990, then the positions, relations, and the development of the situation could be straightened out.

[Popescu] A last question, Mr. Tokes. Speakers at the Congress said that you were the charismatic personality of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Do you agree with that definition?

[Tokes] They said it, ask them.

Poll on Popularity of Yugoslav Leaders

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in Serbo-Croatian 22-23 Jun 91 pp 4-5

[Unattributed article: "Markovic First for the Third Time: Yugoslav Rating of Yugoslav Politicians"]

[Text] With a new increase in his average rating since the March poll, the federal prime minister has kept first place. His rating increased in all the republics except Serbia, where it has been around four [on a scale of one to 10] in all three polls. Veljko Kadijevic is second, and the moderate pair Izetbegovic and Gligorov have climbed to third and fourth place. Milosevic is 13th in Yugoslavia, but (still) second in Serbia. In Croatia, Drnovsek is first, Mesic is second, Markovic is third, and Tudjman is fourth.

BORBA's already regular quarterly rating of politicians on the Yugoslav scene is increasingly sharing the fate of Yugoslavia, and becoming not one, but rather six different ratings for six different scenes. It will be said that this is nothing new. Naturally, we were also aware that information spheres were exclusivistic; we knew that public opinion was so divided that in our poll it was no longer necessary to research those divisions, but rather to start with them.... More than that was demonstrated in this poll, however: It was demonstrated that the process for Yugoslav republics to become independent, in regard to their "citizens'" attitudes, is almost complete, and that they are virtually autarchic communities that are out of touch with each other and have nothing in common. One gets the impression that there is increasingly less of the characteristic animosity, dominant until recently, which is typical of political and other entities when there is still hope that they have not been completely divided.

Respondents' willingness to participate in the poll varied: from Croatia, where it was the least, to Macedonia and Slovenia, whose respondents were the most willing to cooperate.

Bogic Bogicevic and Branko Kostic are the least recognized politicians (about 15 percent of the respondents were unable to identify them, and thus rate them as well).

Once Again, Ante Markovic

In December the federal prime minister was first; his average rating fell considerably in March, but he kept first place. Now, in June, he is first again, with a new increase in his average rating (this time it amounts to 7.10). Broken down by republics, the federal prime minister's actions fare as follows:

Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, his traditional strongholds, still award him high ratings, and to an even greater extent (Bosnia-Hercegovina, with 8.54, and Macedonia, with as much as 9.19), and he is number one on both republic lists. In Croatia, his status has again improved a little (7.79), and now he is in an enviable third place after Drnovsek and Mesic, but ahead of

Tudjman. In Montenegro, Markovic's average rating increased considerably, and now amounts to as much as 7.13 (thus, above his overall Yugoslav average, which, admittedly, is only enough for seventh place in the Montenegrin rating). In Slovenia, it "jumped" slightly (5.78), and in Serbia, polls have shown that from measurement to measurement, it ranges around 4 (4.18).

All in all, it is good enough for Markovic's convincing first place ahead of second-ranked Veljko Kadijevic. His average rating is 6.22, while in the previous poll it was 5.1, which was then sufficient for fifth place. Contrary to expectations, he fared very well in all areas, although admittedly somewhat more poorly, but not drastically so in Slovenia (4.27) and Croatia (3.98). Federal officials are at the top—that was also the case in previous polls.

This time, the two federal officials are followed by two republic leaders who are admittedly moderate and Yugoslav-oriented: Alija Izetbegovic and, in fourth place, Kiro Gligorov. Another Macedonian representative offered on our list, Vasil Tupurkovski, also won a place as the last in the top five, but this is a decline for him, since he was fourth in the last poll. The greatest decline was experienced by Slovene representatives. Janez Drnovsek has fallen from second to seventh place since the March poll, and Milan Kucan has fallen from third to tenth place. The last are Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, in that order, and Stjepan Mesic was scarcely somewhat better ranked than them.

Ratings By Republic

| Republic | Leader | Rating |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------|
| Serbia | Slobodan Unkovic | 7.82 |
| | Slobodan Milosevic | 7.17 |
| | Momir Bulatovic | 7.08 |
| | Veljko Kadijevic | 6.89 |
| | Borisav Jovic | 6.89 |
| | Janez Drnovsek | 8.19 |
| Croatia | Stjepan Mesic | 8.15 |
| | Ante Markovic | 7.79 |
| | Franjo Tudjman | 7.60 |
| | Milan Kucan | 7.46 |
| | Janez Drnovsek | 8.20 |
| Slovenia | Milan Kucan | 7.46 |
| | Lojze Peterle | 6.55 |
| | Stjepan Mesic | 6.52 |
| | Alija Izetbegovic | 6.49 |
| | Ante Markovic | 8.53 |
| Bosnia-Hercegovina | Alija Izetbegovic | 6.93 |
| | Veljko Kadijevic | 6.93 |
| | Bogic Bogicevic | 6.41 |
| | Nijaz Durakovic | 6.30 |
| | Momir Bulatovic | 8.43 |
| Montenegro | | |

Ratings By Republic (Continued)

| Republic | Leader | Rating |
|-----------|--------------------|--------|
| | Borisav Jovic | 8.11 |
| | Milo Djukanovic | 8.03 |
| | Slobodan Milosevic | 7.86 |
| | Branko Kostic | 7.76 |
| Macedonia | Ante Markovic | 9.19 |
| | Kiro Gligorov | 8.57 |
| | Vasil Tupurkovski | 8.54 |
| | Veljko Kadjevic | 7.62 |
| | Stojan Andov | 7.51 |

Sovereign Republics

Naturally, broken down by republics the situation appears completely different, and a considerable number of new faces have become involved.

In Macedonia, where, as we said, Ante Markovic is convincingly in first place, he is followed by two Macedonians: Gligorov (8.57) and Tupurkovski (8.54), and then Kadjevic (7.62) "imposed himself" ahead of a third Macedonian, Stojan Andov. Also very well rated and in a very good place is the next competitor on the Macedonian list who has (since recently) been allied to the Macedonian political option: Alija Izetbegovic (7.50), and, as on previous occasions, Ljupco Georgievski did irreparably worse (2.92)—in complete disproportion to the election results of the party that he heads.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina as well, where Markovic is also in first place, Kadjevic is also the only other one—sharing second and third place with an average rating of 6.93—to disturb the domination by "local" politicians. Izetbegovic is side by side with Kadjevic (in terms of ratings, of course), and is followed by Bogic Bogicevic (6.41) and Nijaz Durakovic (6.36). We can say of the following ones, Karadzic (3.74) and Kljuhic (4.88) that they are not highly rated (or appreciated) by our respondents. Perhaps an explanation for such an order could be sought in the national structure of the respondents (see box).

The situation in Slovenia is clear. The top three are Drnovsek (8.20), still slightly better ranked than Kucan (8.10), and Peterle considerably behind them (6.55). Next come Mesic (6.52), the unexpectedly well-rated Izetbegovic (6.49), the expectedly well-rated Tudjman (6.26), and also Gligorov (5.92). Only after these "open or concealed confederalists" come Ribicic, Markovic, Tupurkovski, and, only somewhere around the middle of the list, Republic Defense Minister Janez Jansa (average rating: 5.61).

The defense minister in Croatia did not distinguish himself there, either: Martin Spegelj is 11th, with 6.06. At the top, however, the situation is as follows: The first is Drnovsek (8.19), who was also first in the previous poll in Croatia; the second, also the same as in March, is Mesic (8.15); the third, doing extremely well this time, is

Markovic (7.79); and the leader, Tudjman, is only in fourth place with 7.6, which is modest for him (he was third in March); and then comes Kucan (7.46), who was also ranked one place higher in March. A general characteristic of the Croatian rating is that everyone's average rating is lower than in the previous poll, but that the order itself has not essentially changed, with the exception of Markovic's jump.

In Serbia, the greatest novelty is that there is nothing new with respect to first place, in view of the surprising March rating. Slobodan Unkovic is still first (the poll was conducted after his resignation), with an average rating of 6.11). It seems, however, that the reflections of the March trends are weaker, because this rating is 0.4 lower than in March. Furthermore, Dragoljub Micunovic, who was ranked fourth in the March poll, has now dropped to sixth place (an average rating of 6.11). Milosevic (7.17) is still second, and in third place, according to the views of our respondents, was Bulatovic (7.08), interestingly ahead of Jovic, who shared fourth and fifth place with Kadjevic (6.89 each). Vojislav Seselj is in eighth place (4.66), after Dragutin Zelenovic (5.42), but ahead of Vuk Draskovic (3.23) who was given a low rating again.

The poll was conducted by the TAKT independent investigative team (Boris Terzic, Olivera Nusic, and Predrag Krstic).

[Box, p 5]**Nationality of the Respondents**

In the sample, the parent nation of each republic constituted about 80 percent of the respondents (88 percent Serbs from Serbia, 73.3 percent Montenegrins from Montenegro, 87.3 percent Macedonians from Macedonia, 81.5 percent Croats from Croatia, 83 percent Slovenes from Slovenia), with one significant exception: Bosnia-Hercegovina. In our central republic, 23.7 percent of those polled were Muslims, 21.7 percent Serbs, 14.6 Croats, and 7.58 percent of the respondents did not state their national identity. The most significant "national" group in this republic consisted of Yugoslavs from Bosnia-Hercegovina: 30.8 percent of all those polled in Bosnia-Hercegovina identified themselves in this way.

[Box, p 5]**Form of the Decision**

We also asked the question: Who is making the greatest effort and who is contributing most to settling our current crisis? And not once did we receive a counter-question: What crisis? Consequently, this is one element in common that everyone recognizes. But are they talking about the same thing?

At the Yugoslav level, the results show that the most consistent worker toward finding a (common) solution is considered to be Slobodan Milosevic (15.4 percent of such responses). He is followed by Ante Markovic (13.4 percent), and then Alija Izetbegovic (7.46 percent) and Kiro Gligorov (7.29 percent). About 25 percent cannot

find such a person or assert that he does not exist, and 10 percent of the respondents decided on two figures (the very diverse variants of the two cover the entire spectrum, from Milosevic-Bulatovic, through Izetbegovic-Gligorov, to Mesic-Drnovsek). The list also included (independently), with a range of "votes" from 3.3 percent to 0.35 percent, Bulatovic, Kucan, Mesic, Drnovsek, Tudjman, Jovic, and Draskovic.

The dispersion of the "votes" in the responses was not as large, however, in response to the question: Who is interfering the most with finding a joint solution? If one

excludes the 30 percent or so who are undecided, or those with the position that there is no one who would meet the description offered, the only thing worth mentioning is the frequency of the appearance of Franjo's (20.9 percent) and Slobodan's (20.4 percent) names. Nearly all of the 15 percent who cited two names agreed on those two. Eleven percent of the respondents insisted on staying with the response in the description. The most frequent answer in this group was "Everyone (is interfering)," and three of them, although without giving names, were quite precise: "All six."

END OF

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